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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRENT D. YOUNG, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY AND AARON 
D. KENNARD SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Court Case No. 20010101-SC 
Category No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Article 8, §3 
of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the court have jurisdiction to hear Young's request for judicial review pursuant 
to §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) when that request was made more than 35 days after Young's original 
request for records to the governmental entity? 
1 
2. Did Young's request present a matter in controversy over which the district 
court had jurisdiction as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a)? 
3. Does Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19 bar the release of un-appealed disciplinary 
records? 
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED 
1) Whether the court had jurisdiction to hear Young's request for judicial review 
pursuant to §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) was raised and considered in both parties motions for 
summary judgment. R. 84,93 and 153. The matter was argued and considered before the trial 
court on September 19, 2000. Addendum C T. pages 12-13. 
2) Whether Young's request dealt with a matter in controversy over which the court 
had jurisdiction as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) was briefed by Appellee in 
their request for the records. R. 57-58. The argument presented was addressed during oral 
argument. Addendum C T. pages 6, 8, 10 and 30. In addition, Appellant argued indirectly 
that the court was without statutory authority because GRAMA could not circumvent the 
civil discovery process and Young's request was not ripe for consideration. Addendum C. 
T. pages 20-21 and 23, 26, 40 and 41. 
3) Whether Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19 bars the release of un-appealed disciplinary 
records was raised in Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 85, 89-91 and 95-97. 
This matter was argued and considered by the trial judge on September 19,2000. Addendum 
C, T. pages 4, 6, 13-17 , 20 and 37-38. 
2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appeal from a grant of summary judgment is reviewed for "correctness". The 
court's conclusions of law receive no deference. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994). The court's factual findings are considered in a light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion was made. A.C. Fin., Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771, 784 
(Utah 1997). 
Each issue stated above is an issue of law. As such, each is reviewed under the 
"correctness" standard. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to a determination of these issues: Utah Code 
Ann. §63-2-101, et seq; Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii);Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a-
e); Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404, et seq.; Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207; Utah Code Ann. §63-2-
304, et seq.; The full text of these provisions are found in Addendum A. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellee (hereinafter referred to as "Young") was a deputy with the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office. R. 49 and 92. Concurrent with his use of the Deputy Sheriffs Merit 
Commission process, he served a request for records on the governmental entity (Salt Lake 
County) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-101 et seq. (Government Records Access 
Management Act) or (GRAMA). R. 50, 92, 102. Young's request under GRAMA, sought 
the disciplinary records of third party officers and Internal Affairs investigative files which 
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involve allegations of sexual activity or inappropriate use of a firearm. Salt Lake County 
denied Young access to these records. R. 50 and R. 89. 
Young filed a request for judicial review of the agency's decision. R. 23-26. The 
matter was presented to the district court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The 
district court determined that Young was entitled to receive the un-appealed disciplinary 
records of other deputies and he was entitled to receive the Sheriffs Office internal 
investigative files which involve allegations of sexual activity or inappropriate use of a 
firearm. R. 166-169 To protect the privacy interests of the officers named in the files, the 
County was ordered to redact the names and identifying information prior to the release. 
R.169 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The trial court heard oral argument on the parties' motions for summary judgment. 
The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and granted Young summary 
judgment. Addendum B. The Court found that Young's right to the information does not 
outweigh the privacy interests of third parties that may be contained in the requested records. 
Based upon this finding, the court ordered the County to redact the identity of the party 
mentioned in the records or information that would reasonably lead to the disclosure of a 
party's identity. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Brent Young was employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office when he was 
terminated for a violation of Sheriff's Office Policy and Procedures. R. 49. Young sought an 
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administrative review of the Sheriff's decision. R. 49-50 While pursuing his administrative 
appeal. Young made a request to the district court for the disciplinary records of third parties. 
R. 50. In addition, Young made a request for the same records under GRAMA. R. 88-89. 
After reviewing Young's request for records, the custodian of records denied Young's 
request. R. 50. On March 28, 2000, Young appealed the denial to the Chief Administrative 
Officer of Sheriff's Department pursuant to the statute. R. 50. The Chief Administrative 
Officer did not respond within the 5 day period provided in Utah Code Ann. §63-2-
401(5)(a)(i). R. 50 and R. 89. By statute, the appeal to the Chief Administrative Officer was 
deemed denied by the Officer's failure to respond timely. R. 89 and 93. 
On April 20,2000, however, the Chief Administrative Officer responded to Young's 
request by providing additional information but denying Young's request for the un-appealed 
disciplinary files and the Internal Affairs investigative files. R. 50, and 88-89. 
On May 16,2000,49 days after Young's appeal to the Chief Administrative Officer, 
Young filed a request for judicial review. R. 1-22. The amended complaint on file with the 
court is Young's request for judicial review of the County's denial of his request for records 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404. R. 23-26. The amended complaint also requests 
attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-802(2)(a). Amended complaint, J 13 and 
Plaintiffs prayer for relief^ 2. Young's request for attorney's fees was denied in the trial 
court and he has not appealed that ruling. R. 267. 
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Young was provided with the records that support the disciplinary action taken against 
him and disciplinary records of other deputies who appealed their discipline. R. 16-20 and R. 
85. Young's GRAMA request included two additional types of records. Young requested the 
disciplinary records of other deputies when discipline imposed was not appealed by the 
deputy and concerned allegations of sexual activity by a deputy or use of a firearm. R. 6. An 
employee disciplinary file consists of a letter indicating the charges or policy violations 
against a deputy and the intended discipline to be imposed. The County denied Young's 
request for the un-appeal disciplinary records because Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) 
prohibits the release of un-appealed disciplinary records. R. 16-20. In addition, the Sheriff 
has internal policies which inform employees that un-appealed disciplinary records are 
private. See Addendum F for Sheriff's Office Policy 2-4-06.03(4) and R. 134. 
Young also requested and was denied access to Sheriff's Office investigative files. 
R. 6. And R. 16-20. These files are created when the Sheriff receives a complaint or 
information that warrants an investigation. Investigative records can contain everything 
beginning with investigations of petty disputes and rumors to egregious crimes and felonies. 
Therefore, they contain information which is both highly private and personal to any person 
who has knowingly or unknowingly been the subject of an investigation. R. 98 and R. 100. 
The Sheriffs annual report indicates that Internal Affairs investigates approximately 200 
claims per year. Young's request would require the agency to search through over 2,000 files 
to determine which files deal with sexual activity or a firearm allegation. 
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Young requested all investigative files relating to the inappropriate use of a firearm 
or sexual activity of a deputy. This request was denied because those records are properly 
classified as "protected documents" under the Government Records Access Management 
Act, and they contain private information the district court and County believe warrants the 
court's protection. R. 16-20. 
The Third District Court heard this case on cross-motions for summary judgment. The 
court acknowledged the third party privacy interests raised by the County. T. pg. 45 at 
Addendum C. The court's order on the parties' motions for summary judgment is attached 
as Addendum B. During oral argument the County raised concerns that the release of un-
appealed disciplinary records violated Utah Code Ann.§ 17-30- 19(2)(a)(ii) and the district 
court was without authority under the Government Records Access Management Act to order 
the release of un-appealed disciplinary records. See T. 16 -17 at Addendum C. Additionally, 
the County pointed out that the Government Records Access Management Act was not 
intended to circumvent other discovery processes nor does it give independent authority to 
order the release of the requested records. See T. 40-41, at Addendum C. 
Although Young has a pending administrative matter with the Deputy Sheriff's Merit 
Commission, this appeal concerns his efforts to gain access to government records through 
another means. This appeal does not alter the proceedings before the Deputy Sheriff s Merit 
Commission. The Deputy Sheriff s Merit Commission has independent authority to subpoena 
records and has not exercised its authority to release these records. Utah Code Ann. §17-30-
21. The Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission has inspected the records in camera and has 
:
 . 1 
determined that it will proceed without releasing the records. See Addendum D. At Young's 
request, the Deputy Sheriff s Merit Commission continued their proceedings until this matter 
is resolved. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Young's request for judicial review was untimely. GRAMA provides three separate 
appeal periods, 30, 35 and 45 days from the agency's denial or failure to respond. Young 
failed to meet any of these statutory time requirements in order for the district court to 
consider the merits of his request for judicial review. The district court lacked jurisdiction 
to hear Young's request. 
Assuming the court finds a right to exercise jurisdiction, the district court was required 
to determine if the requested records were appropriately classified as protected documents. 
In doing so, the district court was required to follow the analysis set forth in Utah Code §63-
2-202(7)(a-e) prior to issuing an order to release the records. The first prong of this analysis 
requires a finding by the district court that the requested records deal with a matter in 
controversy over which the court has jurisdiction. The records requested by Young were not 
embroiled in a matter in controversy over which the district court had jurisdiction. The Salt 
Lake County Deputy Sheriff s Merit Commission had jurisdiction over Young's termination, 
which is the matter in controversy. It was clear error for the district court to proceed through 
the five step analysis when it could not meet the jurisdiction requirement set forth in statute 
because the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter in controversy. Without jurisdiction over 
Young's termination, the district court could not order the release of a record properly 
classified as protected. 
8 
In addition, the district court incorrectly interpreted Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e) 
as providing it with authority to release the un-appealed disciplinary records. These records 
are specifically covered by another state statute. Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) states 
that un-appealed disciplinary records will remain private. It was clear error for the district 




YOUNG'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW WAS 
UNTIMELY PURSUANT TO §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii). 
A timely appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b)(ii), is a jurisdictional 
requirement. Specifically, the statute mandates that a party file their petition for judicial 
review within 35 days if the governmental entity fails to respond. The statute states: 
"(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than: 
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request 
by either providing the requested records or denying the request in whole or 
in part; 
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to 
respond to the request1; or 
i 
Before a claimant is allowed to seek judicial review of a governmental agency's 
decision regarding records access he must first appeal to entity's decision to the chief 
administrative officer. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401(1) (2001). Upon receipt of the claimant's 
appeal the chief administrative officer has 5 days to respond to the claimant with a 
determination of his claim. Id. §63-2-401(5). If the officer does not respond within 5 days 
the claimant's appeal is deemed to have been denied and accordingly he has 30 days to 
petition for further administrative or judicial review. Id. §63-2-402. 
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(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if: 
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401 (l)(b) occur; 
and 
(B) The chief administrative officer failed to make a determination 
under Section 63-2-401. " Id. 
Young filed his administrative appeal on March 28, 2000. R. 3, fl 1; R. 12; R. 89, f 
4; R. 167. The County did not respond to his request within its mandated five day period 
which by statutory operation denies the request. Id. §63-2-401 (5)(b). R. 3, <][12; R. 16; R. 89, 
f 4. Because of this statutory denial, Young had 35 days from the date of his initial filling to 
petition for judicial review by the district court. On April 20, 2000, the County sent Young 
notice of its denial. R. 16; R. 167. Young's receipt of a letter of denial, nineteen days after 
the statutory five day limit, did not enlarge his appeal period. Retherford v. Industrial Comm., 
739 P.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an administrative body's further reconsideration 
of it's own decision did not extend or toll the claimant's statutory responsibility to petition 
for judicial review once the statutory period began). As the Utah Court of Appeals held in 
Retherford, the time limits of jurisdiction of the administrative judicial bodies are, "fixed by 
statute" and therefore any action that exceeds those time limits are void. Id. at 12, citing 
Schocknmyer v. Industrial Commission, 463 P.2d 562 (Utah 1970). Under Utah case 
authority and the statutory period found in Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401(5) Young's request 
for judicial review was untimely, and improperly considered and granted by the district court. 
Young's argument that the April 20,2000 letter extends the time period for requesting 
judicial review is contrary to Utah case law. The Utah Supreme Court considered a similar 
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argument in Harper Investments, Inc. v. Auditing Division, Utah State Tax Commission, 868 
P.2d 813 (Utah 1994). In that case, the Tax Commission argued to the Court that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear Harper Companies appeal because it missed the statutory deadline for 
obtaining judicial review. The provision at issue in Harper required a request for review to 
be filed within thirty days from the date the agency decision is issued or deemed to have been 
issued. Harper at 815. The court in Harper found the appeal timely because the agency had 
authority to reconsider its decision. 
The Government Records Management Act has no similar provision for 
reconsideration. Therefore, the County, acting through the Sheriffs Office, is without 
authority to reconsider the request unless the agency could meet the requirements for 
extenuating circumstances pursuant Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b)(iii). This subsection 
provides an extra ten days to respond before the request is deemed denied if extenuating 
circumstances are present. Because there were no extenuation circumstances, Young's appeal 
to the Chief Administrative Officer is deemed denied after 5 days. Neither party claims the 
County meets the requirements set forth for extenuating circumstances, and the extra ten days 
are no benefit to Young because his appeal is beyond the 45 day requirement set forth in 
subsection (iii) for extenuating circumstances. 
Unlike the provisions with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act which permits 
state agencies governed by that act to exercise continuing jurisdiction, the Government 
Records Management Act does not provide the agency authority to exercise continuing 
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jurisdiction. A finding by this Court of continuing jurisdiction would render the third 
subsection of Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b) meaningless. Therefore, in order to provide 
full meaning to all three subsections contained at Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b), each 
subsection must be interpreted to provide a limit to the agency's authority to respond. 
Applying the statutory 5 day response period, Young's appeal to the agency was deemed 
denied on April 1,2000. To invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, Young had to file no 
later than May 1, 2000. Because he did not, the district court was without jurisdiction to 
consider his request for judicial review. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION 
OVER THE CONTROVERSY WHICH PREVENTED THE ISSUANCE 
OF AN ORDER RELEASING A PROTECTED RECORD. 
When a request for judicial review comes before the district court, the judge must first 
determine if the record was properly classified by the government agency. In this case, the 
County classified both types of records as "protected documents". Utah Code Ann. §63-2-
202. Although this classification was disputed by Young, who argued the records were public 
documents, the district court supported the agencies classification. R. 51-54; R. 61. Young 
had the burden of contesting the County's classification. Young argued that since the 
investigations were complete the documents became public records. R. 51-54 and T. pg. 3 
at Addendum C. The district court's findings do not dispute the protected classification. 
Addendum B, page 2, f 3. In fact, the findings acknowledge the privacy interests of third 
persons, a fact which justifies the protected classification used by the County. Addendum B, 
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page 3, f6. Had the district court supported Young's contention that the records were public, 
the district court could immediately order the records released without further analysis. 
Instead, the district court used Utah Code §63-2-202(7) which permits the court, under 
certain circumstances, to order the release of protected records2. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7) (a)-(d) provides the requirements to issuing an order 
for the release of properly classified documents to persons not otherwise authorized by the 
statute. The first requirement that the court must address is whether the requested records 
deal with a matter in controversy over which the court has jurisdiction. 
In the district court proceeding Section 63-2-202(7)(a) was addressed by the County 
in two ways. First, the County argued that GRAMA was not intended to circumvent the civil 
discovery process, citing Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207. In reviewing the legislative history of 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207, it is clear that in 1992 the sponsor of H.B.400 originally 
requested language which would prevent party litigants from requesting records from a 
governmental entity relating to the subject matter of litigation3. 
As a second point, the County argued that to permit the district court to order the 
release of records for the specific purpose of using the requested information in an 
2
 Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7) (a) acts as a gate keeping provision. 
Appellee briefed and argued that the jurisdiction requirement was met. Although, 
Appellant did not directly address the issue below, it would be plain error for a trial court 
to ignore the jurisdictional requirement within the statute. Davis v. Grand County, 905 
P.2d 888 (Utah App. 1995). 
3
 See H.B.400 submitted by Rep. Marty Stephens in 1992, footnote 11. 
Chapter 280, Laws of Utah (1992) 
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administrative proceeding violated the doctrine of ripeness4. 
The doctrine of ripeness prevents a trial court from considering issues which are 
contingent on future events which may not occur. See State v. Ortiz J 999 UT 84, 987 P.2d 
39 for a full discussion of the doctrine of ripeness. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7) (a) requires that the requested records "deal with a 
matter in controversy over which the court has jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7) 
(a), (2000). In the case of Young, a controversy over which the court had jurisdiction was 
not present because his matter was presently pending before the Deputy Sheriffs Merit 
Commission. The district court was without authority to order the release of a properly 
classified record when the statute did not specifically make an exception for Young's request 
nor did the court have a matter before it in which it could issue an order pursuant the 
requirements set forth at Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7)(a-e). 
Although this particular subsection of GRAMA has not been interpreted by the 
appellate courts of this state, its meaning is clear. The district court ignored the statutory 
prerequisite to issuing an order releasing a protected document. Essentially, the district court 
was without authority to order the release of a properly classified document. Utah Code Ann. 
§63-2-202(7)(a) was drafted to prevent the district court from releasing protected documents, 
when no matter in controversy is presently pending before the judge. Additional support for 
4
 Young had already made the same request to the Deputy Sheriffs Merit 
Commission and at the time of the district court hearing the Commission had not yet ruled 
upon Young's request. 
14 
this interpretation can be found in case law defining the phrase "jurisdiction over a matter 
in controversy" Washington County v. State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 73, 133 P.2d 564 
(Utah 1943); State v. Third Judicial Dist. Ct. 27 Utah 336, 75 P. 739 (Utah 1904); (writ of 
prohibition will not issue when the lower court has jurisdiction over the matter in 
controversy) and Cast v. Cast 1 Utah 112, (Utah Terr., 1871) (discussed statute which 
limited the probate court's jurisdiction "provided that they shall not have jurisdiction of any 
matter in controversy" when title or boundaries are at issue.). 
GRAMA sets out the specific criteria that government agencies must meet in order 
to classify documents as "protected". Only when the government agency can satisfy the 
statutory requirements for classifying a record as "protected" can it restrict access 
accordingly. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-304. Protected records can be shared with other 
governmental agencies pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-206 and provided to the persons 
identified in Utah Code Ann. §63-2-203(4). Most importantly, a protected record can be 
disclosed pursuant to a court order. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7). However, the first 
limitation on receiving a court order is that the requested record must deal with a matter over 
which the court has jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) 
When a requestor, who does not meet the statutory requirements for obtaining a 
protected document, seeks judicial review, they are limited to an analysis of the agency's 
classification. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a). If the classification is correct, the requestor 
is bound by the agency's classification of the document unless the court with jurisdiction 
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over the matter in controversy issues an order releasing the document. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-
202(7)(a). This section is intended to require persons seeking records over which there is a 
matter in controversy to present that request to the body with current jurisdiction over the 
controversy. See Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207(2)(b). To read the statute any other way renders, 
either Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) or Utah Code Ann.§63-2-207(2)(b) inoperable. 
When faced with a question of statutory construction, the court looks first to plain language 
of the statute. Guiterrez v. Medlv. 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 1998). A statute should be 
construed as a whole, with all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other. 
Lieber v. ITT Harford Ins. Center, Inc.. 200 UT 90, 15 P.3d 1030. 
To give consistent meaning and harmony to both Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207(2)(b) 
and Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a), Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) must be read to limit 
the court's jurisdiction to matters over which it has current jurisdiction. To read Utah Code 
Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) as giving the court jurisdiction with every request for judicial review 
would provide no meaning to the jurisdictional sections of GRAMA . Furthermore, it would 
disregard the intent of Utah Code Ann. §63-2-207(2)(a)(i) and (ii) making non-disclosed 
records privileged until otherwise ordered. 
Young's primary argument to the district court was that without access to these 
records he would be denied a due process hearing before the Deputy Sheriffs Merit 
Commission. R. 52-63; R. 151-162 and T. 31-32 at Addendum C. The district court based 
its decision to release the records on Young's right to due process in a proceeding before the 
16 
Deputy Sheriff s Merit Commission. R. 168, <j[ 2.; T. pg. 45 at Addendum C. When the district 
court made its decision, the Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission had not ruled on Young's 
request for records or their potential use in their administrative proceeding.5 T. pg. 45 at 
Addendum C. The district court prematurely determined Young's need for the requested 
records when the matter was clearly pending before an administrative body with statutory 
jurisdiction. This situation demonstrates the basis for requiring the requested records to deal 
with a matter over which the court has jurisdiction. Without this requirement, a litigant at the 
administrative level could circumvent the authority of the administrative body and prevent 
the timely adjudication by appealing records issues to the district court in advance of a 
decision by the administrative body. Likewise, if Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) is not read 
to require the court to have jurisdiction over the matter in controversy, then there is the 
5 
The transcript hearing for the motion for summary judgment contains the following 
language indicating the merits upon which the district court Judge relied in issuing his 
bench ruling: 
"And my immediate reaction in this case has been that the, the administrative 
remedies have not been exhausted and that the plaintiff should go back as far as the 
Merit Commission is concerned and have a hearing and yet I cannot get around the 
basic understanding that in any case a person is entitled to due process up front. I 
can't understand how in a criminal case a person can go to trial with out receiving due 
process and receive the discovery and the information, and even if I deny the request, 
allow it go back, then it's just going to come back here before, again, if due process 
is alleged and then, of course, the he has the burden of proving that due process was 
not granted. 
I'll, the Court is of the opinion and I so rule that the plaintiff is entitled to the 
records asked for and I specifically say, as asked for, with the material redacted. I 
think the right of privacy is more, more important in this situation that the due process 
of the plaintiff, and if there's information that is going to disclose who these infer, the 
other officers were, I, of course I want that definitely out." 
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potential for inconsistent orders from two separate district court judges, the first with 
jurisdiction over the controversy and the second with jurisdiction over the GRAMA request. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) should be read to require jurisdiction over the 
matter in controversy prior to issuance of an order. The district court failed to meet this 
requirement and was prevented by the statute from issuing its order. 
in. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §17-30-19 PROHIBITS THE RELEASE OF 
UN-APPEALED DISCIPLINARY RECORDS 
As a sworn deputy with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Young's 
employment was governed by the Deputy Sheriffs Merit Act. Utah Code Ann. §17-30-1 
et seq. When a sworn deputy is subject to disciplinary action by the Sheriffs department, 
the person ordering the discipline shall "file written charges with the commission; and 
serve the officer with a copy of the charges". The charging document consists of a letter 
to the deputy notifying him of allegations, policy violations and intended disciplinary 
action. The deputy has a right to appeal the charge to the commission. Utah Code Ann. 
§17-30-19 (2)(a)(l). 
Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) specifically provides that; "(ii) In the 
absence of an appeal, a copy of the charges under Subsection (1) may not be made public 
without the consent of the officer charged". Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii), (2000). 
Young appealed the decision to terminate his employment. As part of his appeal 
hearing, Young requested from the Sheriffs department the un-appealed disciplinary 
records of other deputies. The County denied his request because in the absence of an 
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administrative appeal the records may not be released without the consent of the deputy 
that was the subject of the discipline. Young does not argue that he has obtained consent 
of the other deputies. Instead, he claims a due process right to have access to and use of 
these records before the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission during his administrative 
appeal. 
When the district court considered Young's request for the un-appealed 
disciplinary records, the County informed the court that Utah Code Ann. §17-30-
19(2)(a)(ii) governed the release of these records and GRAMA requires the district court 
to comply with Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a-e) prior to ordering the release of a 
protected record. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e) provides in pertinent part 
as follows; 
" where access is restricted by a rule, statute, or regulation referred to in 
Subsection 63-2-20l(3)(b), the court has authority independent of this chapter to 
order disclosure." 
Subsection 63-2-20 l(3)(b) addresses "records to which access is restricted pursuant to 
court rule, another state statute,...." Utah Code Ann.§17-30- 19(2)(b)(ii) is a state statute 
that restricts the release of un-appealed disciplinary records. 
Since Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202 (7)(e) requires that when another statute restricts 
access the court must have authority independent of GRAMA to release the record, the 
district court was required to identify its authority to release the un-appealed disciplinary 
records of deputies. 
The County argued before the trial court that Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 
prohibited the release of the un-appealed disciplinary records and the court was without 
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authority to order their release. R. 95-97; R. 132. No evidence was before the trial court 
that another statute authorized the release of un-appealed disciplinary records. Therefore, 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e), read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. §17-30-
19(2)(b)(ii), is controlling and prohibits the release of the un-appealed disciplinary 
records. 
Before the district court, Young asserted only a right to due process in a collateral 
administrative matter, as the basis for his request for the disciplinary records. R. 52-63 
and R. 151-162. The County therefore requests this Court to reverse the decision of trial 
court for its failure to appropriately apply the standards set forth at §63-2-202 (7)(e). 
Specifically, that it was clear error to release the un-appealed disciplinary records of other 
deputies in contradiction to Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii). 
CONCLUSION 
A timely appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401 (5)(a)(i), is a jurisdictional 
requirement which Young failed to meet. Young's request was deemed denied after 5 
days pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-40l(5)(b)(l), and after 35 days the court was 
without jurisdiction to hear Young's request for judicial review. 
Going beyond the court's lack of jurisdiction, this court should find that the district 
court failed to interpret Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) as requiring it to have 
jurisdiction over the parties' controversy. It was error for the district court to order the 
release of records that deal with a matter over which it had no jurisdiction. Such an order, 
violates Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) and should be reversed. 
Addressing the release of the un-appealed disciplinary records, it was error for the 
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district court to order their release. The statutory language contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) is controlling and prevents the trial court from releasing unchallenged 
disciplinary actions pursuant to a GRAMA request. 
In conclusion, this Court should find that the trial court was without jurisdiction to 
hear Young's request for judicial review and dismiss this matter. In the alternative, this 
Court should find that Utah Code Ann. §63-2-202(7)(a) prevented the district court from 
issuing an order for the release of records and that Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19(2)(a)(ii) is 
controlling and specifically prevents the release of unchallenged disciplinary records of 
sworn officers. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The district court acted without jurisdiction when it considered Young's request 
for these records. The inherently private nature of these files is worthy of protection by 
this court. The district court's decision circumventing the jurisdiction of the 
administrative body and ultimately releasing records without statutory authority is an 
issue that should be fully considered by this court. The County believes that oral argument 
on the issues presented will assist the court in resolving the issues presented. 
DATED this <ZJ_ day of August, 2001. 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
/yjjL/r?, SU/Q& 
VALERIE M. WILDE 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM A 
17-30-19. Disciplinary charges and officer grievances 
— Appeal to commission — Hearing — Find-
ings. 
(1) Each person who orders the demotion, reduction in pay, 
suspension, or discharge of a merit system officer for any cause 
«t forth in Section 17-30-18 shall: 
(a) file written charges with the commission; and 
(b) serve the officer with a copy of the written charges. 
(2) (a) (i) An officer who is the subject of charges under 
Subsection (1) may, within ten days after service of 
the charges, appeal in writing to the commission. 
(ii) In the absence of an appeal, a copy of the 
charges under Subsection (1) may not be made public 
without the consent of the officer charged, 
(b) If an officer files a grievance, as defined by the 
commission, and exhausts all internal grievance proce-
dures, if any, the officer may, within ten days after 
receiving notice of the final disposition of the grievance, 
file an appeal with the commission. 
(3) (a) The commission shall: 
(i) fix a time and place for a hearing upon the 
charges or appeal of the officer grievance; and 
(ii) give notice of the hearing to the parties, 
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b)(ii), each 
hearing under this Subsection (3) shall be held not 
less than ten and not more than 90 days after an 
appeal or grievance is filed. 
(ii) A hearing may be held more than 90 days after 
an appeal or grievance is filed if: 
(A) the officer and employer agree; or 
(B) for good cause the commission so orders. 
(4) (a) If the aggrieved officer so desires, the hearing shall 
be public, 
(b) The parties may be represented by counsel at the 
hearing. 
(5) After the hearing the commission shall make its deci-
sion in writing, including findings of fact, and shall mail a copy 
to each party. 2000 
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53-2-909. Records made public after 75 years. 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
03-2-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Government Records Access 
and Management Act." 1991 
03-2-102. Leg is la t ive in tent . 
(1) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two 
constitutional rights: 
(a) the public's right of access to information concern-
ing the conduct of the public's business; and 
(b) the right of privacy in relation to personal data 
gathered by governmental entities. 
(2) The Legislature also recognizes a public policy interest 
in allowing a government to restrict access to certain records, 
as specified in this chapter, for the public good. 
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature to: 
(a) promote the public's right of easy and reasonable 
access to unrestricted public records; 
(b) specify those conditions under which the public 
interest in allowing restrictions on access to records may 
outweigh the public's interest in access; 
(c) prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental 
entities by permitting confidential treatment of records 
only as provided in this chapter; 
(d) provide guidelines for both disclosure and restric-
tions on access to government records, which are based on 
the equitable weighing of the pertinent interests and 
which are consistent with nationwide standards of infor-
mation practices; 
(e) favor public access when, in the application of this 
act, countervailing interests are of equal weight; and 
(f) establish fair and reasonable records management 
practices. 1992 
63-2-103. Definit ions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audit" means: 
(a) a systematic examination of financial, manage-
ment, program, and related records for the purpose of 
determining the fair presentation of financial state-
ments, adequacy of internal controls, or compliance 
with laws and regulations; or 
(b) a systematic examination of program proce-
dures and operations for the purpose of detennining 
their effectiveness, economy, efficiency, and compli-
ance with statutes and regulations. 
(2) "Chronological logs" mean the regular and custom-
ary summary records of law enforcement agencies and 
other public safety agencies that show the time and 
general nature of police, fire, and paramedic calls made to 
the agency and any arrests or jail bookings made by the 
agency. 
(3) "Classification," "classify," and their derivative 
forms mean determining whether a record series, record, 
or information within a record is public, private, con-
trolled, protected, or exempt from disclosure under Sub-
section 63-2-201(3)(b). 
(4) (a) "Computer program" means a series of instruc-
tions or statements that permit the functioning of a 
computer system in a manner designed to provide 
storage, retrieval, and manipulation of data from the 
computer system, and any associated documentation 
and source material that explain how to operate the 
computer program. 
(b) "Computer program" does not mean: 
(i) the original data, including numbers, text, 
voice, graphics, and images; 
(ii) analysis, compilation, and other manipu-
lated forms of the original data produced by use 
of the program; or 
(iii) the mathematical or statistical formulas 
(excluding the underlying mathematical algo-
rithms contained in the program) that would be 
used if the manipulated forms of the original 
data were to be produced manually. 
(5) (a) "Contractor" means: 
(i) any person who contracts with a govern-
mental entity to provide goods or services di-
rectly to a governmental entity; or 
(ii) any private, nonprofit organization that 
receives funds from a governmental entity, 
(b) "Contractor" does not mean a private provider. 
(6) "Controlled record" means a record containing data 
on individuals that is controlled as provided by Section 
63-2-303. 
(7) "Designation," "designate," and their derivative 
forms mean indicating, based on a governmental entity's 
familiarity with a record series or based on a governmen-
tal entity's review of a reasonable sample of a record 
series, the primary classification that a majority of 
records in a record series would be given if classified and 
the classification that other records typically present in 
the record series would be given if classified. 
(8) "Government audit agency" means any governmen-
tal entity that conducts audits. 
(9) (a) "Governmental entity" means: 
(i) executive department agencies of the state, 
the offices of the governor, lieutenant governor, 
state auditor, attorney general, and state trea-
surer, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the 
Board of Examiners, the National Guard, the 
Career Service Review Board, the State Board of 
Education, the State Board of Regents, and the 
State Archives; 
(ii) the Office of the Legislative Auditor Gen-
eral, Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, 
Office of Legislative Research and General Coun-
sel, the Legislature, and legislative committees, 
except any political party, group, caucus, or rules 
or sifting committee of the Legislature; 
(iii) courts, the Judicial Council, the Office of 
the Court Administrator, and similar administra-
tive units in the judicial branch; 
(iv) any state-funded institution of higher edu-
cation or public education; or 
(v) any political subdivision of the state, but, if 
a political subdivision has adopted an ordinance 
or a policy relating to information practices pur-
suant to Section 63-2-701, this chapter shall 
apply to the political subdivision to the extent 
specified in Section 63-2-701 or as specified in 
any other section of this chapter that specifically 
refers to political subdivisions. 
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(b) "Governmental entity" also means every office, 
agency, board, bureau, committee, department, advi-
sory board, or commission of the entities listed in 
Subsection (9)(a) that is funded or established by the 
government to carry out the public's business. 
(10) "Gross compensation" means every form of remu-
neration payable for a given period to an individual for 
services provided including salaries, commissions, vaca-
tion pay, severance pay, bonuses, and any board, rent, 
housing, lodging, payments in kind, and any similar 
benefit received from the individual's employer. 
(11) "Individual" means a human being. 
(12) (a) "Initial contact report" means an initial writ-
ten or recorded report, however titled, prepared by 
peace officers engaged in public patrol or response 
duties describing official actions initially taken in 
response to either a public complaint about or the 
discovery of an apparent violation of law, which 
report may describe: 
(i) the date, time, location, and nature of the 
complaint, the incident, or offense; 
(ii) names of victims; 
(iii) the nature or general scope of the agency's 
initial actions taken in response to the incident; 
(iv) the general nature of any injuries or esti-
mate of damages sustained in the incident; 
(v) the name, address, and other identifying 
information about any person arrested or 
charged in connection with the incident; or 
(vi) the identity of the public safety personnel 
(except undercover personnel) or prosecuting at-
torney involved in responding to the initial inci-
dent. 
(b) Initial contact reports do not include follow-up 
or investigative reports prepared after the initial 
contact report. However, if the information specified 
in Subsection (a) appears in follow-up or investigative 
reports, it may only be treated confidentially if it is 
private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclo-
sure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b). 
(13) "Person" means any individual, nonprofit or profit 
corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or other 
type of business organization. 
(14) "Private provider" means any person who con-
tracts with a governmental entity to provide services 
directly to the public. 
(15) "Private record" means a record containing data on 
individuals that is private as provided by Section 63-2-
302. 
(16) "Protected record" means a record that is classified 
protected as provided by Section 63-2-304. 
(17) "Public record" means a record that is not private, 
controlled, or protected and that is not exempt from 
disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201(3 Kb). 
(18) (a) "Record" means all books, letters, documents, 
papers, maps, plans, photographs, films, cards, tapes, 
recordings, electronic data, or other documentary 
materials regardless of physical form or characteris-
tics: 
(i) which are prepared, owned, received, or 
retained by a governmental entity or political 
subdivision; and 
(ii) where all of the information in the original 
is reproducible by photocopy or other mechanical 
or electronic means. 
(b) "Record" does not mean: 
(i) temporary drafts or similar materials pre-
pared for the originator's personal use or pre-
pared by the originator for the personal use of an 
individual for whom he is working; 
(ii) materials that are legally owned by an 
individual in his private capacity; 
(iii) materials to which access is limited by the 
laws of copyright or patent unless the copyright 
or patent is owned by a governmental entity or 
political subdivision; 
(iv) proprietary software; 
(v) junk mail or commercial publications re-
ceived by a governmental entity or an official or 
employee of a governmental entity; 
(vi) books and other materials that are cata-
loged, indexed, or inventoried and contained in 
the collections of libraries open to the public, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics of 
the material; 
(vii) daily calendars and other personal notes 
prepared by the originator for the originator's 
personal use or for the personal use of an indi-
vidual for whom he is working; 
(viii) computer programs as defined in Subsec-
tion (4) that are developed or purchased by or for 
any governmental entity for its own use; or 
(ix) notes or internal memoranda prepared as 
part of the deliberative process by a member of 
the judiciary, an administrative law judge, a 
member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, or a 
member of any other body charged by law with 
performing a quasi-judicial function. 
(19) "Record series" means a group of records that may 
be treated as a unit for purposes of designation, descrip-
tion, management, or disposition. 
(20) "Records committee" means the State Records 
Committee created in Section 63-2-501. 
(21) "Records officer" means the individual appointed 
by the chief administrative officer of each governmental 
entity, or the political subdivision to work with state 
archives in the care, maintenance, scheduling, designa-
tion, classification, disposal, and preservation of records. 
(22) "Schedule," "scheduling," and their derivative 
forms mean the process of specifying the length of time 
each record series should be retained by a governmental 
entity for administrative, legal, fiscal, or historical pur-
poses and when each record series should be transferred 
to the state archives or destroyed. 
(23) "State archives" means the Division of Archives 
and Records Service created in Section 63-2-901. 
(24) "State archivist" means the director of the state 
archives. 
(25) "Summary data" means statistical records and 
compilations that contain data derived from private, 
controlled, or protected information but that do not dis-
close private, controlled, or protected information. 1994 
63-2-104. Administrat ive Procedures Act not appli-
cable. 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, does 
not apply to this chapter except as provided in Section 
63-2-603. 1992 
63-2-105. Confidentiality agreements . 
If a governmental entity or political subdivision receives a 
request for a record that is subject to a confidentiality agree-
ment executed before April 1, 1992, the law in effect at the 
time the agreement was executed, including late judicial 
interpretations of the law, shall govern access to the record, 
unless all parties to the confidentiality agreement agree in 
writing to be governed by the provisions of this chapter. 1992 
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PART 2 
ACCESS TO RECORDS 
f 3*2-201. Right to inspect records and rece ive cop ies of records. 
J (1) Every person has the right to inspect a public record free 
^charge , and the right to take a copy of a public record during 
formal working hours, subject to Sections 63-2-203 and 63-2-
204. 
(2) All records are public unless otherwise expressly pro-
vided by statute. 
(3) The following records are not public: 
(a) records that are private, controlled, or protected 
under Sections 63-2-302, 63-2-303, and 63-2-304; and 
(b) records to which access is restricted pursuant to 
court rule, another state statute, federal s tatute, or fed-
eral regulation, including records for which access is 
governed or restricted as a condition of participation in a 
state or federal program or for receiving state or federal 
funds. 
(4) Only those records specified in Section 63-2-302, 63-2-
303, or 63-2-304 may be classified private, controlled, or 
protected. 
(5) (a) A governmental entity may not disclose a record 
that is private, controlled, or protected to any person 
exce£rr?as provided in Subsection (5)(b), Section 63-2-202, 
or Section 63-2-206. 
(b) A governmental entity may disclose records tha t are 
private under Subsection 63-2-302(2) or protected under 
Section 63-2-304 to persons other than those specified in 
Section 63-2-202 or 63-2-206 if the head of a governmental 
entity, or a designee, determines that there is no interest 
in restricting access to the record, or that the interests 
favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction 
of access. 
(6) (a) The disclosure of records to which access is governed 
or limited pursuant to court rule, another s tate statute, 
federal statute, or federal regulation, including records 
for which access is governed or limited as a condition of 
participation in a state or federal program or for receiving 
state or federal funds, is governed by the specific provi-
sions of that statute, rule, or regulation. 
(b) This chapter applies to records described in Subsec-
tion (a) insofar as this chapter is not inconsistent with the 
statute, rule, or regulation. 
(7) A governmental entity shall provide a person with a 
certified copy of a record if: 
(a) the person requesting the record has a right to 
inspect it; 
(b) the person identifies the record with reasonable 
specificity; and 
(c) the person pays the lawful fees. 
(8) (a) A governmental entity is not required to create a 
record in. response to a request. 
(b) Upon request, a governmental entity shall provide a 
record in a particular format if: 
(i) the governmental entity is able to do so without 
unreasonably interfering with the governmental en-
tity's duties and responsibilities; and 
(ii) the requester agrees to pay the governmental 
entity for its costs incurred in providing the record in 
the requested format in accordance with Section 
63-2-203. 
(c) Nothing in this section requires a governmental 
entity to fulfill a person's records request if the request 
unreasonably duplicates prior records requests from that 
person. 
(9) If a person requests copies of more than 50 pages of 
records from a governmental entity, and, if the records are 
contained in files tha t do not contain records tha t are exempt 
from disclosure, the governmental entity may: 
(a) provide the requester with the facilities for copying 
the requested records and require tha t the requester 
make the copies himself; or 
(b) allow the requester to provide his own copying 
facilities and personnel to make the copies at the govern-
mental entity's offices and waive the fees for copying the 
records. 
(10) (a) A governmental entity tha t owns an intellectual 
property right and that offers the intellectual property 
right for sale or license may control by ordinance or policy 
the duplication and distribution of the material based on 
terms the governmental enti ty considers to be in the 
public interest. 
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit 
or impair the rights or protections granted to the govern-
mental entity under federal copyright or patent law as a 
result of its ownership of the intellectual property right. 
(11) A governmental entity may not use the physical form, 
electronic or otherwise, in which a record is stored to deny, or 
unreasonably hinder the rights of persons to inspect and 
receive copies of a record under this chapter. 1994 
63-2-202. Access to private, control led, and protected 
documents . 
(1) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a 
private record to: 
(a) the subject of the record; 
(b) the parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated 
minor who is the subject of the record; 
(c) the legal guardian of a legally incapacitated indi-
vidual who is the subject of the record; 
(d) any other individual who: 
(i) has a power of attorney from the subject of the 
record; 
(ii) submits a notarized release from the subject of 
the record or his legal representative dated no more 
than 90 days before the date the request is made; or 
(iii) if the record is a medical record described in 
Subsection 63-2-302(1 Kb), is a health care provider, 
as defined in Subsection 26-33a-102(7), if releasing 
the record or information in the record is consistent 
with normal professional practice and medical ethics; 
or 
(e) any person to whom the record must be provided 
pursuant to court order as provided in Subsection (7) or a 
legislative subpoena as provided in Title 36, Chapter 14. 
(2) (a) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a 
controlled record to: 
(i) a physician, psychologist, certified social work-
er, insurance provider or agent, or a government 
public health agency upon submission of a release 
from the subject of the record that is dated no more 
than 90 days prior to the date the request is made 
and a signed acknowledgment of the terms of disclo-
sure of controlled information as provided by Subsec-
tion (b); and 
(ii) any person to whom the record must be dis-
closed pursuant to court order as provided in Subsec-
tion (7) or a legislative subpoena as provided in Title 
36, Chapter 14. 
(b) A person who receives a record from a governmental 
entity in accordance with Subsection (2)(a)(i) may not 
disclose controlled information from tha t record to any 
person, including the subject of the record. 
(3) If there is more than one subject of a private or con-
trolled record, the portion of the record tha t pertains to 
another subject shall be segregated from the portion that the 
requester is entitled to inspect. 
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(4) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a 
protected record to: 
(a) the person who submitted the record; 
(b) any other individual who: 
(i) has a power of attorney from all persons, gov-
ernmental entities, or political subdivisions whose 
interests were sought to be protected by the protected 
classification; or 
(ii) submits a notarized release from all persons, 
governmental entities, or political subdivisions whose 
interests were sought to be protected by the protected 
classification or from their legal representatives 
dated no more than 90 days prior to the date the 
request is made; or 
(c) any person to whom the record must be provided 
pursuant to a court order as provided in Subsection (7) or 
a legislative subpoena as provided in Title 36, Chapter 14. 
(5) A governmental entity may disclose a private, con-
trolled, or protected record to another governmental entity, 
political subdivision, another state, the United States, or a 
foreign government only as provided by Section 63-2-206. 
(6) Before releasing a private, controlled, or protected 
record, the governmental entity shall obtain evidence of the 
requester's identity. 
(7) A governmental entity shall disclose a record pursuant 
to the terms of a court order signed by a judge from a court of 
competent jurisdiction, provided that: 
(a) the record deals with a matter in controversy over 
which the court has jurisdiction; 
(b) the court has considered the merits of the request 
for access to the record; and 
(c) the court has considered and, where appropriate, 
limited the requester's use and further disclosure of the 
record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of 
private or controlled records, business confidentiality in-
terests in the case of records protected under Subsections 
63-2-304(1) and (2), and privacy interests or the public 
interest in the case of other protected records; 
(d) to the extent the record is properly classified pri-
vate, controlled, or protected, the interests favoring ac-
cess, considering limitations thereon, outweigh the inter-
ests favoring restriction of access; and 
(e) where access is restricted by a rule, statute, or 
regulation referred to in Subsection 63-2-201(3Kb), the 
court has authority independent of this chapter to order 
disclosure. 
(8) (a) A governmental entity may disclose or authorize 
disclosure of private or controlled records for research 
purposes if the governmental entity: 
(i) determines that the research purpose cannot 
reasonably be accomplished without use or disclosure 
of the information to the researcher in individually 
identifiable form; 
(ii) determines that the proposed research is bona 
fide, and that the value of the research outweighs the 
infringement upon personal privacy; 
(iii) requires the researcher to assure the integrity, 
confidentiality, and security of the records and re-
quires the removal or destruction of the individual 
identifiers associated with the records as soon as the 
purpose of the research project has been accom-
plished; 
(iv) prohibits the researcher from disclosing the 
record in individually identifiable form, except as 
provided in Subsection (b), or from using the record 
for purposes other than the research approved by the 
governmental entity; and 
(v) secures from the researcher a written state-
ment of his understanding of and agreement to the 
conditions of this subsection and his understanding 
that violation of the terms of this subsection may 
subject him to criminal prosecution under Section 
63-2-801. 
(b) A researcher may disclose a record in individually 
identifiable form if the record is disclosed for the purpose 
of auditing or evaluating the research program and no 
subsequent use or disclosure of the record in individually 
identifiable form will be made by the auditor or evaiuator 
except as provided by this section. 
(c) A governmental entity may require indemnification 
as a condition of permitting research under this subsec-
tion. 
(9) (a) Under Subsections 63-2-201(5)(b) and 63-2-401(6) a 
governmental entity may disclose records that are private 
under Section 63-2-302, or protected under Section 63-2-
304 to persons other than those specified in this section. 
(b) Under Subsection 63-2-403(ll)(b) the Records Com-
mittee may require the disclosure of records that are 
private under Section 63-2-302, controlled under Section 
63-2-303, or protected under Section 63-2-304 to persons 
other than those specified in this section. 
(c) Under Subsection 63-2-404(8) the court may require 
the disclosure of records that are private under Section 
63-2-302, controlled under Section 63-2-303, or protected 
under Section 63-2-304 to persons other than those speci-
fied in this section. 1994 
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PART 3 
CLASSIFICATION 
63-2-301. Records that must be disclosed. 
(1) The following records are public except to the extent 
they contain information expressly permitted to be treated 
confidentially under the provisions of Subsections 63-2-
201(3)(b) and (6)(a): 
(a) laws; 
(b) names, gender, gross compensation, job titles, job 
descriptions, business addresses, business telephone 
numbers, number of hours worked per pay period, dates of 
employment, and relevant education, previous employ-
ment, and similar job qualifications of the governmental 
entity's former and present employees and officers exclud-
ing: 
(i) undercover law enforcement personnel; and 
(ii) investigative personnel if disclosure could rea-
sonably be expected to impair the effectiveness of 
investigations or endanger any individual's safety; 
(c) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions, and orders that are made by a governmental 
entity in an administrative, adjudicative, or judicial pro-
ceedings except that if the proceedings were properly 
closed to the public; the opinion and order may be with-
held to the extent that they contain information that is 
private, controlled, or protected; 
(d) final interpretations of statutes or rules by a gov-
ernmental entity unless classified as protected as pro-
vided in Subsections 63-2-304(15), (16), and (17); 
(e) information contained in or compiled from a tran-
script, minutes, or report of the open portions of a meeting 
of a governmental entity as provided by Title 52, Chapter 
4, Open and Public Meetings, including the records of all 
votes of each member of the governmental entity; 
(f) judicial records unless a court orders the records to 
be restricted under the rules of civil or criminal procedure 
or unless the records are private under this chapter; 
(g) records filed with or maintained by county record-
ers, clerks, treasurers, surveyors, zoning commissions, 
the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, the School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, the Divi-
sion of Oil, Gas and Mining, the Division of Water Rights, 
or other governmental entities that give public notice of: 
(i) titles or encumbrances to real property; 
(ii) restrictions on the use of real property; 
(iii) the capacity of persons to take or convey title 
to real property; or 
(iv) tax status for real and personal property; 
(h) records of the Department of Commerce that evi-
dence incorporations, mergers, name changes, and uni-
form commercial code filings; 
(i) data on individuals that would otherwise be private 
under this chapter if the individual who is the subject of 
the record has given the governmental entity written 
permission to make the records available to the public; 
(j) documentation of the compensation that a govern-
mental entity pays to a contractor or private provider; 
(k) summary data; and 
(1) voter registration records, including an individual's 
voting history, except for those parts of the record that are 
classified as private in Subsection 63-2-302(l)(h). 
(2) The following records are normally public, but to the 
extent that a record is expressly exempt from disclosure, 
access may be restricted under Subsection 63-2-201(3Xb), 
Section 63-2-302, 63-2-303, or 63-2-304: 
(a) administrative staff manuals, instructions to staff, 
and statements of policy; 
(b) records documenting a contractor's or private pro-
vider's compliance with the terms of a contract with a 
governmental entity; 
(c) records documenting the services provided by a 
contractor or a private provider to the extent the records 
would be public if prepared by the governmental entity; 
(d) contracts entered into by a governmental entity; 
(e) any account, voucher, or contract that deals with 
the receipt or expenditure of funds by a governmental 
entity; 
(f) records relating to government assistance or incen-
tives publicly disclosed, contracted for, or given by a 
governmental entity, encouraging a person to expand or 
relocate a business in Utah, except as provided in Sub-
section 63-2-304(34); 
(g) chronological logs and initial contact reports; 
(h) correspondence by and with a governmental entity 
in which the governmental entity determines or states-an 
opinion upon the rights of the state, a political subdivi-
sion, the public, or any person; 
(i) empirical data contained in drafts if: 
(i) the empirical data is not reasonably available to 
the requester elsewhere in similar form; and 
(ii) the governmental entity is given a reasonable 
opportunity to correct any errors or make 
nonsubstantive changes before release; 
(j) drafts that are circulated to anyone other than: 
(i) a governmental entity; 
(ii) a political subdivision; 
(iii) a federal agency if the governmental entity 
and the federal agency are jointly responsible for 
implementation of a program or project that has been 
legislatively approved; 
(iv) a government-managed corporation; or 
(v) a contractor or private provider; 
(k) drafts that have never been finalized but were 
relied upon by the governmental entity in carrying out 
action or policy; 
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(1) original data in a computer program if the govern-
mental entity chooses not to disclose the program; 
(m) arrest warrants after issuance, except that, for 
good cause, a court may order restricted access to arrest 
warrants prior to service; 
(n) search warrants after execution and filing of the 
return, except that a court, for good cause, may order 
restricted access to search warrants prior to trial; 
(o) records that would disclose information relating to 
formal charges or disciplinary actions against a past or 
present governmental entity employee if: 
(i) the disciplinary action has been completed and 
all time periods for administrative appeal have ex-
pired; and 
(ii) the charges on which the disciplinary action 
was based were sustained; 
(p) records maintained by the Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands, the School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration, or the Division of Oil, Gas and 
Mining that evidence mineral production on government 
lands; 
(q) final audit reports; 
(r) occupational and professional licenses; 
(s) business licenses; and 
(t) a notice of violation, a notice of agency action under 
Section 63-46b-3, or similar records used to initiate pro-
ceedings for discipline or sanctions against persons regu-
lated by a governmental entity, but not including records 
that initiate employee discipline. 
(3) The list of public records in this section is not exhaustive 
and should not be used to limit access to records. 1999 
63-2-302. Private records. 
(1) The following records are private: 
(a) records concerning an individual's eligibility for 
unemployment insurance benefits, social services, welfare 
benefits, or the determination of benefit levels; 
(b) records containing data on individuals describing 
medical history, diagnosis, condition, treatment, evalua-
tion, or similar medical data; 
(c) records of publicly funded libraries that when ex-
amined alone or with other records identify a patron; 
(d) records received or generated for a Senate or House 
Ethics Committee concerning any alleged violation of the 
rules on legislative ethics, prior to the meeting, and after 
the meeting, if the ethics committee meeting was closed to 
the public; 
(e) records received or generated for a Senate confirma-
tion committee concerning character, professional compe-
tence, or physical or mental health of an individual: 
(i) if prior to the meeting, the chair of the commit-
tee determines release of the records: 
(A) reasonably could be expected to interfere 
with the investigation undertaken by the com-
mittee; or 
(B) would create a danger of depriving a per-
son of a right to a fair proceeding or impartial 
hearing; 
(ii) after the meeting, if the meeting was closed to 
the public; 
(f) records concerning a current or former employee of, 
or applicant for employment with, a governmental entity 
that would disclose that individual's home address, home 
telephone number, social security number, insurance cov-
erage, marital status, or payroll deductions; 
(g) that part of a record indicating a person's social 
security number if provided under Section 31A-23-202, 
31A-26-202, 58-1-301, 61-1-4, or 61-2-6; and 
(h) that part of a voter registration record identifying a 
voter's driver license or identification card number, Social 
Security number, or last four digits of the Social Secxnitfci 
number. v* (2) The following records are private if properly classified 
by a governmental entity: .- , 
(a) records concerning a current or former employee o£ 
or applicant for employment with a governmental entity-
including performance evaluations and personal status 
information such as race, religion, or disabilities, but not 
including records that are public under Subsection 63-2-
301(l)(b) or 63-2-301(2)(o), or private under Subsection 
63-2-302(l)(b); 
(b) records describing an individual's finances, except 
that the following are public: 
(i) records described in Subsection 63-2-301(1); 
(ii) information provided to the governmental en-
tity for the purpose of complying with a financial 
assurance requirement*;6r 
(iii) records that must be disclosed in accordance 
with another statute; 
(c) records of independent state agencies if the disclo-
sure of those records would conflict with the fiduciary 
obligations of the agency; 
(d) other records containing data on individuals the 
disclosure of which constitutes a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy; and 
(e) records provided by the United States or by a 
government entity outside the state that are given with 
the requirement that the records be managed as private 
records, if the providing entity states in writing that the 
record would not be subject to public disclosure if retained 
by it. 
(3) (a) As used in this Subsection (3), "medical records" 
means medical reports, records, statements, history, diag-
nosis, condition, treatment, and evaluation. 
(b) Medical records in the possession of the University 
of Utah Hospital, its clinics, doctors, or affiliated entities 
are not private records or controlled records under Section 
63-2-303 when the records are sought: 
(i) in connection with any legal or administrative 
proceeding in which the patient's physical, mental, or 
emotional condition is an element of any claim or 
defense; or 
(ii) after a patient's death, in any legal or admin-
istrative proceeding in which any party relies upon 
the condition as an element of the claim or defense. 
(c) Medical records are subject to production in a legal 
or administrative proceeding according to state or federal 
statutes or rules of procedure and evidence as if the 
medical records were in the possession of a nongovern-
mental medical care provider. 1999 
63-2-303. Controlled records. 
A record is controlled if: 
(1) the record contains medical, psychiatric, or psycho-
logical data about an individual; 
(2) the governmental entity reasonably believes that: 
(a) releasing the information in the record to the 
subject of the record would be detrimental to the 
subject's mental health or to the safety of any indi-
vidual; or 
(b) releasing the information would constitute a 
violation of normal professional practice and medical 
ethics; and 
(3) the governmental entity has properly classified the 
record. 1992 
63-2-304. Protected records. 
Tn7 following records are protected if properly classified by 
a governmental entity: 
(1) trade secrets as defined in Section 13-24-2 if the 
person submitting the trade secret has provided the 
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governmental entity with the information specified in 
Section 63-2-308; 
(2) commercial information or nonindividual financial 
information obtained from a person if: 
(a) disclosure of the information could reasonably 
be expected to result in unfair competitive injury to 
the person submitting the information or would im-
pair the ability of the governmental entity to obtain 
necessary information in the future; 
(b) the person submitting the information has a 
greater interest in prohibiting access than the public 
in obtaining access; and 
(c) the person submitting the information has pro-
vided the governmental entity with the information 
.„ specified in Section 63-2-308; 
(3) commercial or financial information acquired or 
prepared by a governmental entity to the extent that 
disclosure would lead to financial speculations in curren-
cies, securities, or commodities that will interfere with a 
planned transaction by the governmental entity or cause 
substantial financial injury to the governmental entity or 
state economy; 
(4) records the disclosure of which could cause commer-
cial injury to, or confer a competitive advantage upon a 
potential or actual competitor of, a commercial project 
entity as defined in Subsection 11-13-3(3); 
(5) test questions and answers to be used in future 
license, certification, registration, employment, or aca-
demic examinations; 
(6) records the disclosure of which would impair gov-
ernmental procurement proceedings or give an unfair 
advantage to any person proposing to enter into a contract 
or agreement with a governmental entity, except that this 
subsection does not restrict the right of a person to see 
bids submitted to or by a governmental entity after 
bidding has closed; 
(7) records that would identify real property or the 
appraisal or estimated value of real or personal property, 
including intellectual property, under consideration for 
public acquisition before any rights to the property are 
acquired unless: 
(a) public interest in obtaining access to the infor-
mation outweighs the governmental entity's need to 
acquire the property on the best terms possible; 
(b) the information has already been disclosed to 
persons not employed by or under a duty of confiden-
tiality to the entity; 
(c) in the case of records that would identify prop-
erty, potential sellers of the described property have 
already learned of the governmental entity's plans to 
acquire the property; or 
(d) in the case of records that would identify the 
appraisal or estimated value of property, the poten-
tial sellers have already learned of the governmental 
entity's estimated value of the property; 
(8) records prepared in contemplation of sale, ex-
change, lease, rental, or other compensated transaction of 
real or personal property including intellectual property, 
which, if disclosed prior to completion of the transaction, 
would reveal the appraisal or estimated value of the 
subject property, unless: 
(a) the public interest in access outweighs the 
interests in restricting access, including the govern-
mental entity's interest in maximizing the financial 
benefit of the transaction; or 
(b) when prepared by or on behalf of a governmen-
tal entity, appraisals or estimates of the value of the 
subject property have already been disclosed to per-
sons not employed by or under a duty of confidenti-
ality to the entity; 
(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal, or 
administrative enforcement purposes or audit purposes, 
or for discipline, licensing, certification, or registration 
purposes, if release of the records: 
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with 
investigations undertaken for enforcement, disci-
pline, licensing, certification, or registration pur-
poses; 
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with 
audits, disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings; 
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a 
right to a fair trial or impartial hearing; 
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the 
identity of a source who is not generally known 
outside of government and, in the case of a record 
compiled in the course of an investigation, disclose 
information furnished by a source not generally 
known outside of government if disclosure would 
compromise the source; or 
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose inves-
tigative or audit techniques, procedures, policies, or 
orders not generally known outside of government if 
disclosure would interfere with enforcement or audit 
efforts; 
(10) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize 
the life or safety of an individual; 
(11) records the disclosure of which would jeopardize 
the security of governmental property, governmental pro-
grams, or governmental recordkeeping systems from 
damage, theft, or other appropriation or use contrary to 
law or public policy; 
(12) records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the 
security or safety of a correctional facility, or records 
relating to incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole, 
that would interfere with the control and supervision of 
an offender's incarceration, treatment, probation, or pa-
role; 
(13) records that, if disclosed, would reveal recommen-
dations made to the Board of Pardons and Parole by an 
employee of or contractor for the Department of Correc-
tions, the Board of Pardons and Parole, or the Depart-
ment of Human Services that are based on the employee's 
or contractor's supervision, diagnosis, or treatment of any 
person within the board's jurisdiction; 
(14) records and audit workpapers that identify audit, 
collection, and operational procedures and methods used 
by the State Tax Commission, if disclosure would inter-
fere with audits or collections; 
(15) records of a governmental audit agency relating to 
an ongoing or planned audit until the final audit is 
released; 
(16) records prepared by or on behalf of a governmental 
entity solely in anticipation of litigation that are not 
available under the rules of discovery; 
(17) records disclosing an attorney's work product, in-
cluding the mental impressions or legal theories of an 
attorney or other representative of a governmental entity 
concerning litigation; 
(18) records of communications between a governmen-
tal entity and an attorney representing, retained, or 
employed by the governmental entity if the communica-
tions would be privileged as provided in Section 78-24-8; 
(19) personal files of a legislator, including personal 
correspondence to or from a member of the Legislature, 
but not correspondence that gives notice of legislative 
action or policy; 
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(20) fa) records in the custody or control of the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel, that , if 
disclosed, would reveal a particular legislator's con-
templated legislation or contemplated course of ac-
tion before the legislator has elected to support the 
legislation or course of action, or made the legislation 
or course of action public; and 
(b) for purposes of this subsection, a "Request For 
Legislation" submitted to the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel is a public document 
unless a legislator submits the "Request For Legisla-
tion" with a request tha t it be maintained as a 
protected record until such time as the legislator 
elects to make the legislation or course of action 
public; 
(21) research requests from legislators to the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel or the Office of 
the Legislative Fiscal Analyst and research findings pre-
pared in response to these requests; 
(22) drafts, unless otherwise classified as public; 
(23) records concerning a governmental entity's strat-
egy about collective bargaining or pending litigation; 
(24) records of investigations of loss occurrences and 
analyses of loss occurrences tha t may be covered by the 
Risk Management Fund, the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, or similar divi-
sions in other governmental entities; 
(25) records, other than personnel evaluations, that 
contain a personal recommendation concerning an indi-
vidual if disclosure would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy, or disclosure is not in 
the public interest; 
(26) records that reveal the location of historic, prehis-
toric, paleontological, or biological resources tha t if known 
would jeopardize the security of those resources or of 
valuable historic, scientific, educational, or cultural infor-
mation; 
(27) records of independent s tate agencies if the disclo-
sure of the records would conflict with the fiduciary 
obligations of the agency; 
(28) records of a public institution of higher education 
regarding tenure evaluations, appointments, applications 
for admissions, retention decisions, and promotions, 
which could be properly discussed in a meeting closed in 
accordance with Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public 
Meetings, provided that records of the final decisions 
about tenure, appointments, retention, promotions, or 
those students admitted, may not be classified as pro-
tected under this section; 
(29) records of the governor's office, including budget 
recommendations, legislative proposals, and policy state-
ments, that if disclosed would reveal the governor's con-
templated policies or contemplated courses of action be-
fore the governor has implemented or rejected those 
policies or courses of action or made them public; 
(30) records of the Office of the Legislative Fiscal 
Analyst relating to budget analysis, revenue estimates, 
and fiscal notes of proposed legislation before issuance of 
the final recommendations in these areas; 
(31) records provided by the United States or by a 
government entity outside the s ta te tha t are given to the 
governmental entity with a requirement tha t they be 
managed as protected records if the providing entity 
certifies that the record would not be subject to public 
disclosure if retained by it; 
(32) transcripts, minutes, or reports of the closed por-
tion of a meeting of a public body except as provided in 
Section 52-4-7; 
(33) records that would reveal the contents of settle-
ment negotiations but not including final settlements or 
empirical data to the extent that they are not otherwise 
exempt from disclosure; 
(34) memoranda prepared by staff and used in the 
decision-making process by an administrative law judge, 
a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, or a 
member of any other body charged by law with perform-
ing a quasi-judicial function; 
(35) records that would reveal negotiations regarding 
assistance or incentives offered by or requested from a 
governmental entity for the purpose of encouraging a 
person to expand or locate a business in Utah, but only if 
disclosure would result in actual economic harm to the 
person or place the governmental entity at a competitive 
disadvantage, but this section may not be used to restrict 
access to a record evidencing a final contract; 
(36) materials to which access must be limited for 
purposes of securing or maintaining the governmental 
entity's proprietary protection of intellectual property 
rights including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets; 
(37) the name of a donor or a prospective donor to a 
governmental entity, including a public institution of 
higher education, and other information concerning the 
donation that could reasonably be expected to reveal the 
identity of the donor, provided that: >- ...J 
(a) the donor requests anonymity in writing; 
(b) any terms, conditions, restrictions, or privi-
leges relating to the donation may not be classified 
protected by the governmental entity under this 
Subsection (37); and 
(c) except for public institutions of higher educa-
tion, the governmental unit to which the donation is 
made is primarily engaged in educational, charitable, 
or artistic endeavors, and has no regulatory or legis-
lative authority over the donor, a member of his 
immediate family, or any entity owned or controlled 
by the donor or his immediate family; 
(38) accident reports, except as provided in Sections 
41-6-40, 4M2a-202, and 73-18-13; 
(39) a notification of workers' compensation insurance 
coverage described in Section 34A-2-205; and 
(40) the following records of a public institution of 
education, which have been developed, discovered, or 
received by or on behalf of faculty, staff, employees, or 
students of the institution: unpublished lecture notes, 
unpublished research notes and data, unpublished manu-
scripts, creative works in process, scholarly correspon-
dence, and confidential information contained in research 
proposals. Nothing in this Subsection (40) shall be con-
strued to affect the ownership of a record. 2000 
63-2-305. Procedure to de termine classif ication. 
(1) If more than one provision of this chapter could govern 
the classification of a record, the governmental entity, shall 
classify the record by considering the nature of the interests 
intended to be protected and the specificity of the competing 
provisions. 
(2) Nothing in Subsection 63-2-302(2), Section 63-2-303, or 
63-2-304 requires a governmental entity to classify a record as 
private, controlled, or protected. 1992 
63-2-306. Duty to evaluate records and m a k e designa-
t ions and classifications. 
(1) A governmental entity shall: 
(a) evaluate all record series that it uses or creates; 
(b) designate those record series as provided by this 
chapter; and 
(c) report the designations of its record series to the 
state archives. 
33-2-404. Judicial review. 
(1) (a) Any party to a proceeding before the records com-
mittee may petition for judicial review by the district 
court of the records committee's order. 
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 days 
after the date of the records committee's order. 
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to the 
petition for judicial review. 
(d) The executive secretary of the records committee 
shall be served with notice of the petition in accordance 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the 
district court of a governmental entity's determination as 
specified in Subsection 63-2-402 (1Kb). 
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than: 
<H) 30 days after the governmental entity has re-
sponded to the records request by either providing 
the requested records or denying the request in whole 
or in part; 
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the govern-
mental entity failed to respond to the request; or 
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records 
if: 
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 
63-2-401(l)(b) occur; and 
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to 
make a determination under Section 63-2-401. 
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall 
contain: 
(a) the petitioners name and mailing address; 
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which 
the appeal is taken, if the petitioner brought a prior 
appeal to the records committee; 
(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental 
entity that issued the initial determination with a copy of 
that determination; 
(d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of 
relief requested; and 
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is 
entitled to relief. 
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a 
protected record, the court shall allow the claimant of business 
confidentiality to provide to the court the reasons for the claim 
of business confidentiality. 
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district 
court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The 
review shall be in camera. 
(7) The court shall: 
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of 
evidence presented to the records committee; 
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a 
jury; and 
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportu-
nity. 
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of 
the various interests and public policies pertinent to the 
classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the 
disclosure of information properly classified as private, 
controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access 
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access. 
(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate, 
limit the requester's use and further disclosure of the 
record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of 
private or controlled records, business confidentiality in-
terests in the case of records protected under Subsections 
63-2-304(1) and (2), and privacy interests or the public 
interest in the case of other protected records. 1995 
ADDENDUM B 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
VALERIE M. WILDE (7345) 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3400 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-2607 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. YOUNG, 
Plaintiff. 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY AND AARON D. 
KENNARD SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 000903955 
Judge H. Wilkinson 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
on September 19, 2000, at 8:00 a.m. on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendants* Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff was personally present and 
represented by Blake A. Nakamura, Esq., the Defendants were represented by Deputy District 
Attorney, Valerie M. Wilde, Esq. The Court having heard orat argument reviewing the motions, 
memorandums and pleadings on file and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the 
^ - ^ t ^ C r ^ v f CW» 
Following Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
i. On February 23, 2000, pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. §§63-2-204 and 
63-2-207 Plaintiff requested records from Defendants concerning any investigation of 
Any sworn member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department where the conduct 
investigated concerned the inappropriate use or handling of a firearm or inappropriate 
sexual conduct, both verbal or physical. On March 14, 2000, Plaintiff received a denial of 
his request signed by Sgt. Maxwell. 
2. On March 28, 2000, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§63-2-401 Plaintiff 
requested a review of Sgt. Maxwell's decision. This request was sent to Sheriff Kennard. 
3. On April 20, 2000, Chief Deputy Carr responded to Plaintiffs request on 
behalf of Sheriff. The response reaffirmed the classification of investigative files as 
protected pursuant to Utah code Ann §§63-2-304(11) and (12) and denied Plaintiff 
access. The request also denied Plaintiff access to disciplinary files that had not been 
appealed pursuant to Utah Code Ann §17-30-19. 
4. On May 16,2000, Plaintiff filed for judicial review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann.§63-2-404. 
5. Plaintiff is a former member of the Salt lake County Sheriffs Department. 
Plaintiff was terminated from his employment on January 14, 2000. Following Plaintiffs 
Termination, he appealed to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Merit Service Commission. 
Proceedings before the Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission are 
currently on 
2 
hold pending resolution of Plaintiff s request for records. 
6. Plaintiffs due process rights do not outweigh the privacy interests of third parties 
that may be contained in the requested information. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs request for judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404(2)(b) 
is taken from the April 20. 2000 letter denying Plaintiff access to the requested records. Using the 
April 20, 2000 date, Plaintiffs request for judicial review is made within the 30 days required by-
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-404 (2)(b)(i) and is timely. 
2. Plaintiffs has a due process right to the requested information and Utah Code 
Ann. §63-2-202(7)(e) provides the court with authority to order the disclosure of the information 
notwithstanding the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19. 
3. Plaintiff has a due process right to gain access to disciplinary records and 
investigative files of any sworn member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department where the 
conduct investigated concerned the inappropriate use or handling of a firearm or inappropriate 
sexual conduct, both verbal or physical. 
4. Plaintiffs right to the information does not outweigh the privacy interests of third 
parties that may be contained in the requested information. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law the Court hereby makes 
the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1/ Defendants shall disclose to the Plaintiff the disciplinary records and investigative 
files of any sworn member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department where the conduct 
investigated concerned the inappropriate use or handling of a firearm or inappropriate sexual 
conduct, both verbal or physical. 
2. Defendants may redact the identity of the party mentioned in the records or 
information that would reasonably lead to the disclosure of a party's identity. 
3. Should a controversy arise concerning what information should be redacted, the 
information shall be submitted to the court for an in camera review. 
4. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
DATED this*y' dav of November. 2QQ0. 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. YOUNG, 
Plaintiff, 
ARRON D. KENNARD, et al., 
Defendant. 
Case No. 000903955 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION HELD SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE HOMER WILKINSON 
^ P Y 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 E.Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: BLAKE NAKAMURA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
948 E. North Union Ave 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
For the Defendant: VALARIE M. WILDE 
Assistant District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
* * * 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 
2 HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: The matter before the Court is case of 
5 Brent Young versus Salt Lake County. The plaintiff is present 
6 and ready to proceed? 
7 MR. NAKAMURA: We are. 
8 THE COURT: The defendant? 
9 MS. WILDE: We are. 
10 THE COURT: You may proceed, counsel. 
11 MR. NAKAMURA: Thank you. Your Honor, may I approach. 
12 I made a courtesy copy of the relevant statutes for the Court 
13 to have. They are, as I looked through my modern code a bit 
14 aged, but the same language is in that Code section just under 
15 different subsections and I'll note that where we depart from 
16 the current code. 
17 Judge, this matter comes before the Court, and we in 
18 fact filed this action kind of as a companion matter that's 
19 going on before the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission, and what 
20 has happened is that the defendants, county sheriff, fired, 
21 terminated Mr. Young. He asserted his due process right to an 
22 administrative hearing challenging that termination. There are 
23 two issues before that board; one, is there factual support 
24 for the charges, and two, is the discipline posed, the 
25 termination, fair and proportionate when considered against 
1 other similar cases involving similar conduct of sworn members 
2 of that department. 
3 We have made the GRAMA request to be prepared at that 
4 administrative hearing and to present our case. We 
5 specifically asked for two areas of information, one of which 
6 concerned information or any correspondence received from the 
7 complaining parties in this case. The defense has responded 
8 that there is none that was received by the department, and 
9 therefore, there's nothing to disclose, and they've denied it 
10 on that basis. Because of some information from the 
11 complaining parties that's kind of a mute point and not really 
12 at issue before the Court today. 
13 The second request that we made was for comparable 
14 cases. We did that in order to have information to go before 
15 the Merit Commission to demonstrate that the discipline imposed 
16 upon Mr. Young is disproportionate to the kind they found him 
17 in violation of, and we wanted to bring in these other cases to 
18 show that, and we did that in reliance of the case Lucas versus 
19 Murray Citv Civil Service Commission where the court looked at 
20 other similar cases, comparable case, to determine whether this 
21 charge were disproportionate. They have denied our requests, 
22 our GRAMA requests for comparable cases. 
23 In denying them they have categorized our requests 
24 into two categories. Our request for investigative 
25 information, the conduct of sworn the member, they have 
categorized as protective records. With regard to the 
discipline imposed, they have categorized that as not public 
records under not the GRAMA statutes, but under the Deputy 
Sheriff's [inaudible] statute, 17-30-19, maintained that that 
statute restricts the disclosure of any disciplinary 
information that may have been imposed on these officers. 
The sole issue now is the request for these 
comparable cases, and I'll address them in kind. We maintain 
that they are public documents. They have maintained, number 
one, that they're protected and they have done so concerning 
the conduct under 63-2-304. Now in the copies I gave you under 
that particular section it's subsection 8 instead of subsection 
9, 9. What it basically says there that protected records are 
records that are properly classified as protected which 
reasonably would interfere with a disciplinary or investigative 
preceeding. If those records reasonably interfere with an 
investigative or disciplinary proceeding they're protective 
records. We maintain they would not reasonably interfere with 
any investigative or disciplinary proceedings. Why? Because 
the records we're asking for have to be cases that have been 
adjudicated, where the investigation is complete, where the 
disciplinary sanctions have been imposed and have been reviewed 
and therefore adjudicated as well. If they're completed, they 
cannot be expected to reasonably interfere with the 
investigative or disciplinary proceedings, and indeed, that's 
the only information that will be of use to our case. Why? 
Because we couldn't rely upon incomplete investigations or 
pending investigations, or disciplinary sanctions that are 
still pending or being reviewed. They're not final yet. We're 
asking for the final results of their investigations and the 
final discipline. They are not protective records. Why? 
Because again, they don't, they would not reasonable interfere 
with the investigative or disciplinary proceeding. 
With regard to the disciplinary sanctions, and their 
reliance on the Merit Commission Statute 17-30-19, they're 
maintaining that it's, we can't disclose that to you because 
that statute restricts us from disclosing it. Our position is 
number 1, it doesn't even apply. It doesn't apply because 
that, that statute applies to the Merit Commission, and our 
requests from the Merit Commission of this information and 
under that statute they can assert that they could not release 
that information. 
But more importantly, as that statute specifies, the 
only concerns to motion, reduction in pay, suspension or 
discharge of a merit employee. It doesn't concern minor 
discipline. Indeed, cases involving minor discipline are going 
to be most probative to Mr. Young's case. Why? Because if 
minor discipline was imposed in a case that had similar facts 
to Mr. Young's, then his termination is a disproportionate 
discipline when compared against these comparable cases, 
because they only resulted in minor discipline. So even if it 
does apply, it doesn't cover all the information we're 
requesting. It would only cover those specific instances, 
suspension, demotion, termination, or reduction in pay. Those 
are the only kinds of disciplinary proceedings it would affect. 
When we go back then, they're not protected records 
because they're not properly classified. Secondly, the Merit 
Commission statute doesn't apply and if it does apply it 
doesn't apply to all of the information we've requested. 
But if that doesn't meet - and therefore, under the 
statute it's public information. If it's not restricted, 
according to the statute, it is therefore public, and that's 
under 63-2-201 and we're entitled to that information. 
The defendants argue in response that no, the Merit 
Commission Statutes do not provide the court with any authority 
to release this information. They maintain that in summary 
that because there is no authority within, because there's no 
authority within GRAMA to release these records, they're 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. They cite, verbatim, 
in fact 63-2-202(7)(e) specifically states that it shall not be 
used for that authority. 
But when we look at that statute and we look 
specifically to that subsection, that is not the case. What it 
states is, sub (e) states verbatim, 63-2-202(7)(e), that's what 
they're citing, this is what it states: "Where access is 
restricted by rule, statute, or regulation referred to in 
Subsection 63-2-201 (3) (b) the court has authority independent 
of this chapter to order disclosure." So indeed there is 
authority within the GRAMA statutes to order disclosure and 
when we look at subsection 7, not just subsection e, in its 
totality, it's clear that it provides that GRAMA section 
provide that clear authority as well because it states 
subsection 7. A governmental entity shall disclose a record 
pursuant to the terms of a court order signed by a judge from a 
court of competent jurisdiction provided that, and a court has 
to go through a statutory analysis. It's a balancing test 
weighing the reasons for access against the reasons restricting 
access. Clearly their argument that there is no authority from 
GRAMA for the Court to order disclosure of restrictive records 
is erroneous. The statute specifically provide that authority. 
They then maintain, Well, court, if you have the authority to 
order disclosure, you cannot consider the reasons for that 
information. Specifically, you can't consider the plaintiff's 
due process interest in getting that information. Your 
analysis is limited to statutory analysis. 
Your Honor, I am unaware of any rule of law, whether 
it be case or statute, that says a statute overrides the 
constitutional principle and if Ms. Wilde has the court, rule 
of law to that effect I'd like to see it. But she doesn't cite 
that in here. I'm aware of a whole string of cases that say 
just the opposite. The statute conflicts with the 
constitutional right, 'statutes invalid, not the right. 
Furthermore, when you look at subsection (e) of the 
statute that I was just speaking of, or subsection (7), 
specifically sub (b), when you go down the analysis of the 
court has to engage in to order the disclosure it states (b) 
the court has considered the merits of the request for access 
to the records. Clearly the court can consider Mr. Young's due 
process interest in obtaining this information. 
The defense go on to say, Well, wait a second, okay, 
that may be the case, but we classify these documents as 
protective for a reason. The reason is to protect the privacy 
interests of the individuals involved in these records. They, 
they cite a string of speculative privacy interest that may be 
compromised if this, if this information is ordered to be 
disclosed. 
Judge, the information that we need has nothing to do 
with the personal identities of the individual officers or 
parties involved in those investigations. All we need is 
records concerning a member of the department, a sworn officer, 
the conduct that gave rise to the investigation and the result 
of that investigation, and the discipline imposed. We need no 
identifying information, because the identification or 
identifying information doesn't go at all, it's not relevant at 
all to the inquiry that we need this information for and that 
1 is, is it comparable to Mr. Young's case. The facts, the 
2 underlying facts, for what's relevant. That's what we're 
3 asking for. So yes, indeed, there may be a whole box load of 
4 privacy interest in this information. We don't need any of 
5 that information, and therefore, the reasons restricting access 
6 really are not relevant, because we're not asking for that 
7 identifying information. 
8 Lastly, the Court - the defendants' argue that this 
9 Court is the wrong forum to be hearing this matter. This 
10 matter should be rightfully be heard before the Merit 
11 Commission. They go on to say that the plaintiff, Mr. Young, 
12 has not allowed the Merit Commission to rule on this matter, 
13 and further they say in their brief that to date the Merit 
14 Commission hasn't found it necessary to order the disclosure. 
15 The clear import from those representations, Your Honor, within 
16 the argument, is that if the Merit Commission hasn't ordered 
17 the disclosure, why should this court order the disclosure of 
18 this information. 
19 Your Honor, I included in my Reply Brief in Exhibit 
20 A, a letter from the Merit Commission directly refuting those 
21 representations. The letter states, number 1 that the 
22 defendants have not timely provided the information on 
23 comparable cases, thereby precluding the commission from having 
24 sufficient amount of time to review these records. Number 2, 
25 that the defendants have failed to provide the commission with 
8 
all the information that they agreed to provide. That last 
argument is patently misleading, Your Honor, and intentionally 
so. 
Ms. Wilde was in those proceedings on Monday the 
11th, day before these Briefs were due, I called her. I 
advised her of that inaccuracy, afforded her an opportunity to 
correct that record, that, that representation, read the letter 
that I would attach as an exhibit directly refuting that. She 
refused to do that. She says no, that's true. Well, the 
letter speaks for itself, Your Honor, likewise her 
representations. I'd ask that whole argument be stricken 
because it is absolutely misleading and not true. Look at the 
attached exhibits from the Merit Commission. 
Judge, in the end this is what we have. Mr. Young 
has a right to this administrative hearing. He has a right in 
order to present, to have a fair hearing to present his case. 
Under the case of Lucas versus Murray City Civil Service 
Commission they clearly look, I've got a copy of the case for 
the Court to review, if you'd like. They, the Supreme Court 
clearly looks at the comparable cases to determine whether the 
discipline imposed in the case at hand was fair and 
consistently imposed. Mr. Young needs this information to 
demonstrate that the discipline he received was not fair and 
proportionate to the discipline when compared against similar 
cases. 
1 They have cited privacy interest in restricting this 
2 information. But, Your Honor, we're not looking for that 
3 information, the private information, the individual, the 
4 identifying information about the individuals involved. We're 
5 only looking for the conduct and the discipline imposed. 
6 That's it. Any private information can be redacted from this 
7 information. It's not necessary. It's not relevant to the 
8 reason why we need it. 
9 So on balance, when you look at Subsection (7) of 
10 that statute, you have a constitutional right to have this 
11 information. You have a Supreme Court case that recognizes 
12 that that's evidence relevant in this inquiry. When you look, 
13 consider the reason restricting access, all they have is 
14 privacy interest. But all that information can be redacted, 
15 and therefore, on balance, clearly the need for this 
16 information outweighs the need to in, the reason for 
17 restricting access. 
18 THE COURT: Do you have any reason to believe that 
19 he's not, he has not been treated fairly? 
20 MR. NAKAMURA: Well we know, we have not gone through 
21 the Merit Commission. They're, they're waiting, so, today. 
22 THE COURT: I said do you have any reason to believe 
23 he has not been treated fairly? 
24 MR. NAKAMURA: Yes, if you look at, if you look at our 
25 opening brief and I think it's Exhibit A, the reasons for his 
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1 termination was based -
2 THE COURT: I know the reason for his termination. 
3 MR. NAKAMURA: Well, well, but, I think this is, this 
4 is what I'm going to, why I'm going to say I have reason to 
5 believe it. They terminated him based upon a finding of poor 
6 judgment, poor word usage. That's what they've terminated him 
7 for. They didn't terminate for any ill intent. In fact, they 
8 said that's not even at issue, in that letter. They terminated 
9 him for poor judgment. 
10 Now I know of at least one case where an officer was 
11 involved in sem, in equally inappropriate sexual behavior and 
12 was not terminated. I'm beginning to hear of other cases where 
13 conduct similar to that of Mr. Young's, or, and even in fact 
14 more egregious to that of Mr. Young's where the discipline was 
15 not termination but was a letter of reprimand. So, yes, there 
16 is. I mean essentially what they're saying is, Hey, all we've 
17 got is poor judgment here and we're gonna discipline for that, 
18 and instead of giving him minor discipline for the poor 
19 judgment, they elevate it to major discipline, and so on the 
20 face of that there is a reason to believe that because the 
21 punishment isn't proportionate on the face to the conduct they 
22 find him in violation of. 
23 THE COURT: Okay, counsel. 
24 MS. WILDE: Your Honor, if I may for just a brief 
25 moment, I want to go over the facts a little bit more. What we 
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1 have initially, and both parties agree what the initial request 
2 for records was, and that was a request for investigative 
3 files. I think Mr, Nakamura has admitted the request for 
4 correspondence is a moot issue, because there is none. When we 
5 replied to that we broke it down into two types of 
6 investigative files, one, disciplinary records and the other 
7 internal affairs investigative files. Those are the two 
8 investigative files contained within the sheriff's office. 
9 That record's request was denied. Mr. Nakamura appealed that 
10 record's request to the Chief Administrative Officer, which is 
11 Sheriff Kennard. Sheriff Kennard, under the statute, did not 
12 respond within the five days. The statute specifically says 
13 that failure to respond within five days is deemed a denial, 
14 and then the statute specifically says you have 35 days from 
15 the record's request and no response to take your appeal. Mr. 
16 Nakamura did not take his appeal in that 35 days. That's our 
17 first motion for summary judgment on the issue of jurisdiction 
18 of this court to even entertain this record's request, meaning 
19 that Mr. Nakamura was untimely. 
20 The sheriff's office did respond on April 20th, 
21 beyond the statutory period. Now Mr. Nakamura in his reply 
22 brief has argued, Well, then you can take your appeal from that 
23 late response. The response that was 16 days late. In order 
24 to do that, Your Honor, you don't give effect to the entire 
25 I statutory provision that talks about how you take an appeal to 
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the district court. There is an ability for a department that 
can't respond timely to say I'm not going to respond because of 
extraordinary circumstances and you have a right to an appeal 
from that statement by the department as well. 
If you, if you allow late appeals from any response 
from the department, no matter when it is given, you in effect 
don't give any credence to the statute which gives specific 
time limits and requires that your appeal be taken within 35 
days. One section says your appeal must be taken within 35 
days, and the other section that we specifically cited in our 
brief which is 63-2-401(5)(b) says if a Chief Administrative 
Officer fails to make a determination within a time specified 
the failure shall be considered the equivalent of an order 
denying the appeal. So that gives 35 days from his request 
that he should have taken his appeal. 
THE COURT: Why did they respond? Why did Sheriff's 
Department respond? 
MS. WILDE: We responded because there were records in 
the initial denial that were public that he was not given, and 
for instance, any deputy that appeals a disciplinary matter to 
the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission lose, loses the privacy 
protections provided under 17-30-19. We provided him I believe 
two files on deputies that appealed their discipline that 
either related to firearms or sexual activity. 
THE COURT: And you don't think that had any, any 
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1 effect of any renewal of any sort? 
2 MS. WILDE: I don't, Your Honor. I don't think we 
3 can, I don't think we can enlarge the jurisdiction by doing 
4 that. 
5 THE COURT: Let's see you, you told me why you 
6 responded and my question is probably not very clear. My 
7 question should have been if he was out of court why did you 
8 review that and give an opportunity to come back to court. In 
9 other words, we had passed 35 days, why'd you renew it? Not 
10 what did you give him, but -
11 MS. WILDE: Right. 
12 THE COURT: - why'd you do it? 
13 MS. WILDE: Because that's when they responded. I 
14 don't think we have a purpose. Those were records that were 
15 denied initially, from the initial request, that he should have 
16 been given. The statute requires us to comply with the act or 
17 there's penalties for our failure to comply and that may have 
18 been one of the reasons. I don't actually know why the 
19 sheriff's office responded late. But they did respond more 
20 than 16 days after that five day period. So within 21 days 
21 after his appeal to the Chief Administrative Officer they sent 
22 him a letter saying, which is Exhibit 1 in our brief, it's also 
23 attached to Mr. Nakamura's. 
24 Regarding the actual records that he's requesting, 
25 I first I want to make note that any disciplinary record that has 
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been appealed he's received copies of them. We have 17-30-19 
which is a provision in the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Act that 
says disciplinary records that are not appealed are 
confidential. Those records Mr. Nakamura's arguing to the 
court that, Well though, it's those records that remain with 
the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission. Well, the Deputy 
Sheriff's Merit Commission is the administrative body over the 
Sheriff's Department. Any discipline, whether it's initiating 
from the sheriff's office, any major discipline, demotion, 
suspension, termination, must be sent to the Deputy Sheriff's 
Merit Commission. So his argument, Well I'm not requesting it 
from them, I'm requesting it from the initiating body, it's the 
same record. We have no greater right to release those 
records. Those are protected. It would give no effect to 17-
30-19 to say the sheriff's office could release the records, 
but the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission could not. All 
charges of major discipline are filed with that body, okay, by, 
by statute. 
GRAMA specifically says that if there is a 
controlling statute, that statute prevails, and this Court 
needs some kind of independent authority to release the 
records. I want to go back over the specific section that Mr. 
Nakamura read, because he only read part of that section to the 
Court, and that's the section that specifically deals with this 
Court's need to have independent authority to release the 
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1 records when there's a statute that controls. That statute 
2 starts out by saying a gover-
3 THE COURT: Which one are you reading from? 
4 MS. WILDE: I am reading from 63-2-3-203(7), and I'm 
5 going to start with subparagraph 7 because there's an important 
6 part there, 63-2-203 subparagraph 7. 
7 MR. NAKAMURA: Isn't it 202, not 203? 
8 THE COURT: Now is that -
9 MS. WILDE: Yeah, I'm sorry, Your Honor, 202. 
10 THE COURT: 202, Subparagraph 7? 
11 MS. WILDE: Right. 
12 THE COURT: [inaudible]. 
13 MS. WILDE: Okay, a governmental entity shall disclose 
14 a record pursuant to the terms of the court order signed by a 
15 judge from a court of competent jurisdiction, provided that, 
16 and that's the part that Mr. Nakamura did not read, we go to 
17 subsection (e) where access is restricted by a rule, statute, 
18 regulation referred to in Subsection 63-201, and that's, we're 
19 referring to 17-30-19 in this instance. The court has 
20 authority independent of this chapter to order disclosure. 
21 That statute prohibits the release of those major disciplinary 
22 records. Mr. Nakamura argued that this section allows release. 
23 We do not believe that it does. There has to be some 
24 independent basis to give that release for the disciplinary 
25 records. So that would be our position on those. 
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1 J Any disciplinary record that has been appealed, that 
2 has already been provided. So we're only dealing with 
3 unappealed disciplinary records, and I believe, Your Honor, 
4 that it's my Exhibit 5 will contain 17-30-19 for the Court. 
5 MR. NAKAMURA: It's also attached to the last statute 
6 that I attached to your packet, Your Honor. 
7 MS. WILDE: And that, and what's important to note 
8 about that particular section, it has just been recently 
9 amended by the legislature, and they have not chosen to 
10 characterize the records of an officer differently. So prior 
11 to this last legislative session this, there had been no 
12 amendment since the %60fs to this statute, and then GRAMA came 
13 along. It has now subsequently been amended with, we can 
14 assume, with some consideration of GRAMA in mind when they 
15 amended 17-30-19, and they made no change to the fact that 
16 these records, unappealed disciplinary records, remain private. 
17 That's the basis for us denying the disciplinary files. 
18 The basis for denying internal affairs files is 
19 different. There is no statute that covers internal affairs 
20 files. We have a request. GRAMA allows you at two points in 
21 time to, to classify records. It allows you to classify 
22 records when you create the record, or it allows you to 
23 classify a record when you get a request. In this particular 
24 case, we classified the records when the request was made. 
25 That classification was protected, and in particular we cited 
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1 63-2-304(9) as our basis for protecting the records. That the 
2 records were created or maintained for civil, criminal, 
3 criminal, or administrative enforcement purposes or for 
4 discipline. That's the basis of our internal affairs files. 
5 That's why they were created. We're investigating some type of 
6 activity and it either is administrative, criminal or civil, 
7 civil. 
8 The reason why we believe that releasing those 
9 records interferes with investigations is because the nature of 
10 the investigations within the sheriff's office. First off, 
11 officers are compelled to give statements to internal affairs 
12 when they're giving an investigation. It's part of their 
13 employment with the sheriff's office. They are given their 
14 garity rights often and compelled to give testimony before that 
15 body. It is important if one officer is compelled to testify 
16 against another officer that we do not release that information 
17 unnecessarily; that we use to the minimal extent possible the 
18 testimony of those other officers when we may be using it 
19 against another officer. Those officers oftentimes are working 
20 back out in the fields with one another and they need to 
21 maintain that, that level of trust with one another, and so 
22 there are definite purposes, even long after the investigation 
23 is concluded, that we don't release other officer's statements 
24 to one another. 
25 There's also good reasons why we may not release a 
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1 confidential informants name even after an investigation has 
2 been concluded. So there's definite records within an internal 
3 affairs file that we do not want to make public even after the 
4 investigation is over with, and then in addition to those types 
5 of records, we even get confidential information. People will 
6 turn over documents, statements that they might not otherwise 
7 do during these types of investigation, and we believe those 
8 third parties have a protected fourth amendment interest in 
9 those type of records. 
10 We believe that the, for the internal affairs file 
11 this Court has the ability under GRAMA to weigh and balance Mr. 
12 Young's need for the record versus these third party's privacy 
13 interest, and the reasons that we classified the records as 
14 protected. I believe this Court has the ability to do that and 
15 the authority under the statute. 
16 What's important to note is that we do have parties 
17 alleging potentially fourth amendment interest. We have 
18 unrepresented third parties here that those files belong to. 
19 They are not connected or referenced in any way to Mr. 
20 Nakamura's discipline - to Mr. Young's discipline, excuse me. 
21 What is important to note is that the case of Lucas 
22 v. Murray City has been cited for authority to turn over the 
23 files. We need these files, these records, to prove that the 
24 discipline is unfair or disproportionate. For the Court, in 
25 our brief, we, and in fact Exhibit 10 will set the standards 
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1 that the sheriff's office uses in disciplinary actions. It is 
2 the sheriff's burden to demonstrate that it has complied with 
3 those requirements. It is not Mr. Young's responsibility to 
4 meet that burden. It will be the sheriff's obligation to meet 
5 the burden that the discipline is consistent, fair, timely, 
6 appropriate, and progressive and it defines that. Those 
7 standards are different than Murray City's standards and that's 
8 the argument why we believe that the Deputy Sheriff Merit 
9 Commission should be the body that's determining what records 
10 are necessary to meet these standards, and we believe that any 
11 argument in asserting that somehow he's losing a due process 
12 right is certainly at this point not ripe for consideration. 
13 We have not been to a hearing before the Deputy Sheriff's Merit 
14 Commission. The Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission has had 
15 those records for some time now. They have not ordered those 
16 records released. They have asked for, not internal affairs 
17 files, but other disciplinary matters so that they could review 
18 them in camera. Those records have been provided. The only 
19 records that we have not provided were minor disciplinary 
20 records. That went with a letter to the Deputy Sheriff's Merit 
21 Commission of which Mr. Nakamura received a copy, explaining 
22 that 17-30-19 we believed prohibited us from releasing that, 
23 even to the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission because they were 
24 unappealed disciplinary matters. 
25 Apart from what Mr. Nakamura attached to his reply 
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1 brief, previously he attached the last letter of the Deputy 
2 Sheriff's Merit Commission which is his Exhibit B. His Exhibit 
3 B specifically notes that the Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission 
4 is extending the hearing until the GRAMA issues are resolved. 
5 That's the last letter that, that either party has received 
6 from the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission. It indicates that 
7 their proceedings are not moving forward until the GRAMA issues 
8 are resolved. 
9 It does not indicate that they have in their own mind 
10 resolved the issue of their in camera review in, in what 
11 records should or should not be released. We do not have an 
12 order or a decision of any type on that issue from that body. 
13 It is our position that they are best suited to determine what 
14 records should be released. The argument that, which I think 
15 is different from Mr. Nakamura's original records request, that 
16 all he is seeking at this point in time is the conduct of the 
17 party's and the outcome as a result of that conduct, is pretty 
18 much the camel's nose within the tent. The minute those 
19 documents are released, they will be released in isolation. In 
20 other words, you'll be able to see some type of dry fact, 
21 misuse of a firearm in some way, and the resulting discipline. 
22 But you won't have any facts to know why that discipline was 
23 arrived at, and the more facts you begin to release, the more 
24 of an invasion of privacy that you begin to pursue into those 
25 records. 
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1 And so we have some definite concerns that we have. 
2 parties that either have a statutory protective right to those 
3 documents, and certainly potential fourth amendment 
4 constitutional rights to privacy and the information that's 
5 contained in the internal affairs files. 
6 THE COURT: What are you saying? Are you saying that 
7 if you release the material which Mr. Nakamura asked for that 
8 it would not be sufficient information, as far as your position 
9 is concerned, as to why that person was terminated? 
10 MS. WILDE: Right. If, if in fact, which I believe is 
11 different than his initial request, his argument to the Court 
12 was all he's seeking is the nature of the conduct and the 
13 outcome, you know, how they were disciplined. 
14 THE COURT: That's what I understand he's asking for 
15 now. 
16 MS. WILDE: Right, and if you'd like me to give the 
17 court examples I'm more than willing to do so. For instance, 
18 if you allege that the sexual activity was an officer having 
19 sex with another female or, or, while married. One of those 
20 situations may result in discipline of the officer. For 
21 instance, let's say the officer had been currently married to a 
22 spouse, living with a spouse and having an adulterous affair. 
23 We regulate the off-duty conduct of officers and that may very 
24 well result in discipline. 
25 J Let's say we have another situation where an officer 
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1 is currently married on the books, but has not resided or lived 
2 with his spouse in years and is consummating a relationship 
3 with somebody else and living together with them. Same conduct 
4 alleged, adulterous affair, but may result in different forms 
5 of discipline based upon the nature of that officer's living 
6 condition, and until you go into those facts, you'll never know 
7 why the particular discipline was reached. 
8 THE COURT: Would you provide in your release of the 
9 one case the officer was living with his wife, the second case 
10 he was not? Are you saying that came too close to privacy? 
11 MS. WILDE: I certainly think, think that that is 
12 Your Honor, because, you know, we're, we're beginning to 
13 discuss all of the facts of the case at that point in time. 
14 THE COURT: What you're saying is that is misleading 
15 to the administrative hearing, or the body that's hearing the 
16 matter. 
17 MS. WILDE: Right, and I believe that that's an 
18 appropriate issue for that administ- I don't believe that those 
19 issues are ripe yet. A hearing has not happened. He has not 
20 been denied due process. I have every reason to believe that 
21 the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission will find a way to 
22 provide Mr. Young with the due process that he is entitled to. 
23 Under the policies of the Sheriff's office he will get those 
24 records that he's entitled to and they will move forward as 
25 they always do with a hearing. The standards that they have 
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1 are different than the standards that they had in the Lucas 
2 case that's cited. We utilize a byf we don't have to have 
3 discipline, similar conduct reach similar discipline. Our 
4 discipline must be fair for the actual act and so that's the 
5 reason why each particular case must be weighed and balanced 
6 upon its own merit. 
7 THE COURT: Now -
8 MS. WILDE: With that, with that, Your Honor, I would 
9 submit. 
10 THE COURT: And why do you say that you're confident 
11 that, that he will receive due process if the hearing goes 
12 forth? 
13 MS. WILDE: Because I believe the Deputy Sheriff's 
14 Merit Commission certainly has the authority to order, they 
15 have not asked for us to provide it in camera investigative 
16 files, meaning the IA files. They have asked for us to provide 
17 in camera the conduct and the outcome of disciplinary records -
18 THE COURT: [inaudible] 
19 MS. WILDE: - in a matrix. 
20 THE COURT: Now what are you saying now? You say 
21 they've asked you to provide what? 
22 MS. WILDE: In camera -
23 THE COURT: Who's asking what? 
24 MS. WILDE: The Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission has 
25 asked for an in camera review of the discipline imposed on 
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officers. So that would be a statement of the conduct and then 
a statement of the outcome. Pretty much what Mr. Nakamura has 
just requested the Court for. 
THE COURT: And you say an in camera review. When you 
say in camera is that by -
MS. WILDE: The deputy sheriff, right. Those 
documents have been placed up before the Deputy Sheriff's Merit 
Commission with the exception of minor discipline, and the 
reason why we have not placed minor discipline before that body 
is because they don't naturally receive minor discipline. They 
do receive copies of all major discipline. 
THE COURT: So what you're saying is that they will 
have all the material information which Mr. Nakamura is asking 
for, they will utilize that, but Mr. Nakamura will not have 
access to it. 
MS. WILDE: I don't know what they will do with it. 
They could very well look at what they have before them and 
decide that Mr. Nakamura needs that information in order to 
give him -
THE COURT: [over talking] 
MS. WILDE: - Mr. Young a due process hearing. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, finish. 
MS. WILDE: They do not have before them internal 
affairs files, nor have they asked for them. In other words, 
they have not said please provide us with internal affairs 
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files. They've only asked for disciplinary records. 
THE COURT: And when does this take place, not by 
time, but I'll, I'll/ before the Merit Commission, which he has 
not gone before, is that what you're saying? 
MS. WILDE: Right. We've had two pre-hearing 
conferences and the latest correspondence which is Exhibit B to 
Mr. Nakamura's Motion for Summary Judgment, indicates that 
they're delaying the actual hearing date until this GRAMA 
request before your court has been determined. 
THE COURT: And if I deny his request, this hearing 
goes forth? 
MS. WILDE: Right. 
THE COURT: Does he then have the right, by he, the 
defendant then have, or the plaintiff, Mr. Nakamura, then have 
the right to come back before this Court to renew their request 
for documents? 
MS. WILDE: Not in that sense. If he goes before the 
Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission and is denied due process, or 
believes that he's been denied due process, he can appeal that 
to this district court. 
THE COURT: You say that his appeal here today is 
premature? 
MS. WILDE: I am, Your Honor. If that's the reason 
for it is the due process issue, that issue itself is 
premature. He has not even had that hearing yet, and so we 
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don't know whether he will or will not be denied due process. 
THE COURT: And statute-wise, where is this covered, 
or is this covered by statute? 
MS. WILDE: It, it is covered by statute in the 
Deputy Sheriff's Merit Act, which is 17-30-1, et seq. That 
tells you the procedural requirements of that hearing body. 
THE COURT: And you cite a statute on your last page 
of your Brief, next to last page you refer to 63-2-404. Begs 
the court to consider to weigh the various interest in public 
policy pursuant, pertinent to the classification disclosure, 
disclosure, what authority do I have under that section? 
MS. WILDE: I believe you can balance Mr. Young's 
request for the records, and he's saying I want the records for 
an administrative hearing. I do not believe that you can, can, 
can consider his due process rights, because those are not yet 
ripe. I believe that you can say, Okay, here's a person asking 
for government records. He wants them for an administrative 
hearing, he's told us that, and you must weigh and balance that 
against the privacy interest of these other third parties who 
are not even here before this Court and decide who, who 
prevails. 
THE COURT: Okay, and I agree with what you say there. 
But do I make that decision now or do I make that decision 
after he has his hearing before the Merit Commission? 
MS. WILDE: I, I believe that you, you can make that 
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decision now on internal affairs files, but I believe that 
17-30-19 is controlling on disciplinary records, and that you 
don't have authority unless there's some statute that I'm 
unaware of at this time that would you give you authority to 
release that. 
.THE COURT: And is that prior to the administrative 
hearing or, or, -
MS. WILDE: Even -
THE COURT: - [over talking] authority any time? 
MS. WILDE: Any time. I don't even believe that the 
Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission can release disciplinary 
files. 
What I think is important to note, Mr. Nakamura stood 
up here and said well I'm hearing rumors about all this kind of 
discipline and that there's even more egregious cases where 
they, the sheriff has done a lot less discipline. There is 
nothing that prevents him from calling those individuals before 
the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission and putting them under 
oath and having them testify. But what he wants is to go on a 
fishing expedition and pull out all these third party's records 
and have their, their privacy violated by laying their 
discipline before them and pick and choose which one of those 
individuals he'd like to put up on the stand. 
If he is aware of individuals, and certainly all 
disciplinary matters within the sheriff's office go before a 
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1 captain's board, he can place the captain's on the stand and 
2 have them testify about whether or not they're fair, or 
3 consistent and appropriate in their discipline, whether they're 
4 timely, 
5 THE COURT: And you say he could call them to testify. 
6 Do you think you, you would disclose this material, it would be 
7 sufficient that he could identify who the officers were. 
8 MS. WILDE: I think some times you could, most 
9 certainly. Sometimes not. I mean, you know, if an officer is 
10 accused of drawing his fire, firearm inappropriately. I mean 
11 there's been so many cases of that he couldn't figure out who 
12 that was, but certainly there's, there's rumors within any 
13 department and if the conduct is egregious enough they 
14 probably, you could find somebody who knew who committed the 
15 act. Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
17 MR. NAKAMURA: Judge, the defendants are trying to 
18 boot strap what's happening between the Merit Commission to 
19 proceedings here today. The statutes are very clear. This is 
20 a GRAMA appeal or judicial review of a GRAMA request. Now does 
21 it have relationships to what's happening before the Merit 
22 Commission? Yes, in one narrow regard. That's the reason why 
23 we're asking for this information. 
24 THE COURT: Why shouldn't you go and have your hearing 
25 before the Merit and -
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1 MR. NAKAMURA: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: - then come back here if you are 
3 unsuccessful? 
4 MR. NAKAMURA: It doesn't, the GRAMA statutes don't 
5 provide that. That's the whole thing, and then that's why I'm 
6 saying these are separate proceedings. When you look at, when 
7 you look at the statute, specifically the GRAMA statutes 
8 [inaudible] judicial review, and I had not included that in, in 
9 the packet that I provided you. But it's under 63-2-404. 
10 THE COURT: Okay, that's the one that's she's 
11 referred to and that I just asked her about. Okay. 
12 MR. NAKAMURA: It does, it doesn't allow this court 
13 to essentially police the proceedings before the Merit 
14 Commission to determine whether Mr. Young has been afforded a 
15 fair hearing or not. It's very specific. We have, we asked 
16 for certain records pursuant to GRAMA. They initially deny it. 
17 We appeal it to the governmental, the head of the agency. It 
18 was denied there. Under this statute we can then ask for a 
19 review of that denial, period. That's it. It does not allow 
20 this Court to kind of retain jurisdiction over this matter, to 
21 police the -
22 THE COURT: Oh, I don't say retains jurisdiction, I 
23 didn't -
24 MR. NAKAMURA: Okay, well then, if that's not the 
25 case, then what would have to be contemplated is that we would 
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1 then have to make another request. 
2 THE COURT: Yeah. 
3 MR. NAKAMURA: And go through the whole slow process. 
4 Any -
5 THE COURT: Isn't that the administrative process? 
6 MR. NAKAMURA: It is not, and I'll explain it this, 
7 this way, Your Honor. We have to go through, as you know 
8 certain administrative steps to challenge the termination. We 
9 have to exhaust those steps before we can go into the courts of 
10 the State to have that role reviewed. Her comment that 
11 therefore your, Mr. Young's assertion that he has a due process 
12 right to this information is premature and should not be before 
13 the Court. It, it's so incredible and its proportions doesn't 
14 make sense. Because this is, this is the translation, this is 
15 the analogy, you got a defendant going to trial. He's going to 
16 be tried in court of law, a recognized, legitimate court of 
17 law, presumptively therefore his rights would be protected. 
18 Prosecution, you don't have to give him anything in advance of 
19 that hearing. Why? Because once you get there you'll see what 
20 the evidence is, and therefore you have due process 
21 protections. 
22 That's not the way that it's done, Your Honor. 
23 That's not the way these matters are litigated or proceed. 
24 Information is disclosed up front, and it's the same in civil 
25 J cases. There's a process of discovery. That's all I'm doing 
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1 here. But because these are governmental records I've got to 
2 go through a GRAMA request to get them. And that, that's 
3 fundamentally all we're dealing with here, and to somehow say 
4 that well, geez, your, your, your assertion on the due process 
5 interest in this, in these records are premature because you 
6 haven't gone through the hearing yet is kind of like telling a 
7 defendant, whether it be civil or criminal, get through your 
8 trial without any information and then we'll review everything. 
9 That's a little too late. We're entitled to this information 
10 up front, and it's limited -
11 THE COURT: No, no. Mr. Nakamura, I understand what 
12 you're saying, and, and, but I understood from counsel, Ms. 
13 Wilde, that you have the right to this hearing before the Merit 
14 Commission. Then if they rule against you, you could then come 
15 to this court to file the appeal, or the request which you have 
16 filed now for these records and upon these records being 
17 disclosed you could then go before their commission. 
18 MR. NAKAMURA: And here's the problem with that, 
19 Judge. 
20 THE COURT: And, one last statement, and if that's 
21 the case, don't you have to exhaust your administrative remedy, 
22 to go before that Merit Commission on the first instance? 
23 MR. NAKAMURA: Sure, and I understand that. First of 
24 all, the statute specifically, 63-2-404 and like statutes 



























Commission. So they don't have the authority to order 
disclosure of this within the GRAMA statute. Now I understand 
what she's saying is that well what a sec. You can go through 
the hearing with the Merit Commission, and then make a request, 
if you, if you feel you were denied due process because you 
were denied certain information. You could then come back 
before this Court and ask for a release of those records, from 
which you will then have, and then you can use for further 
proceedings. 
If the Court will recall her first argument that she 
made when she first stood up here, our request was not timely. 
How in the world does she think that our request would be 
timely not within 35 days, not 60 days, but some time after the 
Merit Commission proceedings have concluded that we can then 
make the request. If, now that clearly would be untimely. 
THE COURT: Does the statute provide anything for -
MR. NAKAMURA: 
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1 Commission, what is the Court above the Merit Commission going 
2 to do? It's going to look to see, look to the record before 
3 the Merit Commission to see if the Merit Commission did it 
4 right. If I don't have information of this stuff, how does it 
5 get into the record? And all of a sudden it's not available on 
6 appeal. It's not there. It's not part of the record. 
7 Here's the other thing that's fundamentally very 
8 important, Your Honor, the matter's, the information that they 
9 have provided to the Merit Commission [inaudible]. First of 
10 all, it is not complete. They didn't provide everything they 
11 agreed to. The Merit Commission letter establishes that. But 
12 more importantly, as she conceded, it's only major discipline. 
13 Well, how is that at all going to be careful, if you really 
14 think about it, why, and it's not going to be helpful for this 
15 reason. If all they have are cases in which major discipline 
16 was imposed, then all they have is major discipline cases to 
17 compare to our case, which is major discipline, and therefore, 
18 it would invariably result in them finding a fair treatment. 
19 What they have not provided are the cases involving minor 
20 discipline, and those are going to be the most probative. Why? 
21 Because if the conduct is similar to that of Mr. Young's, but 
22 the party received minor discipline, then Mr. Young's 
23 discipline sits disproportionate to the discipline received in 
24 that case, and that case becomes very relevant. So even though 
25 the Merit Commission may, may disclose this stuff to me in the 
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1 course of the proceedings there, they can only disclose what 
2 they have, and what they have is only major discipline, not the 
3 minor discipline. That's the other problem, and that's why I 
4 filed the objection and the motion to continue that resulted in 
5 the letter that I've attached as an exhibit to the Reply. They 
6 didn't provide everything they would provide. 
7 Ms. Wilde also says, Well, I'm on a fishing 
8 expedition. I was very clear, Your Honor, I'm only asking for 
9 cases involving similar conduct, because after all that's what 
10 the examination is limited to. 
11 She says, Well, wait a second, Lucas deals with a 
12 different standard than what we got to deal with here. It may 
13 be worded differently, Your Honor, but what it also says in 
14 total is the punishment has to be fair and consistent, and when 
15 you look at Lucas, that means, you know, it's plain reading, 
16 that means you got to look to other case to see. You can't 
17 just look at this one case to say whether it was fair and 
18 consistent, because you have nothing else to measure against. 
19 Furthermore, Your Honor, the privacy interest, I, I 
20 can appreciate the privacy interest in this information I'm 
21 requesting. Clearly, some of it may be sensitive private 
22 information. But I don't need the names of the parties 
23 involved, at all. I don't need the source of the information 
24 either. All I need is the conduct that was alleged and invest, 
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ve asked for the 
narrow. Why? 
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I mean the bottom line is this, Your Honor, well, let 
me touch upon a few, just address briefly. She says we weren't 
timely. I think I've adequately briefed that in our reply. 
That, it says you have 30 days after a governmental entity to 
respond to the records by either providing the request for 
records or denying. They, they filed the response on April 
20th. We filed this action on May 16th. 
THE COURT: [inaudible] cite statute limitations she 
reviewed? 
MR. NAKAMURA: Well, no, I'm just, I'm just saying 
it's a little further than that. And I answered it a little 
bit. Clearly under subsection (i) we are within the time 
period. Now she relied upon subsection (2) to say it's 35 
days, because we didn't respond within five days as required by 
the statute and the statute says if you don't respond in five 
days it can be taken as a denial, and therefore she says your 
35 days ran from that beginning, when you filed that request, 
because we didn't respond. But when you look at the statute 
you, particularly the word between subsection (i) and 
subsection (iii) it has the word or in it. So you can do it 
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1 under subsection (i) or subsection (2) or subsection (3), or 
2 furthermore, look at subsection (3). It specifically refers to 
3 that statute that says if they don't respond in five days it's 
4 a denial. Subsection 3 specifically refers to that. If that's 
5 what was contemplated by subsection 2, they would have said it, 
6 because they said it in subsection 3. But you don't even have 
7 to go that far, because it's an alternative statute, and we 
8 filed within 30 days after response, period. We fit, we fit 
9 within the time frames provided by statute. 
10 They contend that there is no authority, also, to 
11 order the disclosure of the disciplinary records, and the 
12 reasoning on this is really quite simple when you look at the 
13 statutes that are provided. They're saying, Hey, they're 
14 restricted under Title 17. Well, when you go to title 63-2 or 
15 63-2-201(3)(b) it says the following records are not public. 
16 Records to which access is restricted pursuant to, among other 
17 things, a state statute. So therefore, if it's restricted by 
18 Title 17, it's restricted from disclosure under 63-2-201(3)(b). 
19 She says, Well, now you have to find an independent authority, 
20 which there is none, to order the disclosure of that. Now that 
21 it's restricted. But when you go back to 63-2-202(7) (e) it 
22 says, and I've read it already, where access is restricted by 
23 rule, statute, or regulation referred to in subsection 63-2-
24 201(3) (b), the same one that they're relying upon to restrict 
25 the Deputy Merit Commission stuff, the court has authority 
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1 independent of this Chapter 2 order disclosure. I don't know 
2 how to read that in any other fashion. It specifically refers 
3 to the statute and the specific subsection and says that 
4 they're relying on, to say that that Title 17 restricts that 
5 information, it specifically refers to that and says no the 
6 court has authority to order that disclosure. Clearly the 
7 Court has the authority to order the disclosure. 
8 Again, bottom line, Your Honor, this, this is 
9 fundamental [inaudible]. We're in administrative litigation 
10 before a board, the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission Board. 
11 There's two issues here. On the second issue I clearly need 
12 this information to address that issue. I'm entitled to it. 
13 The GRAMA provides a means for me to discover that information, 
14 and when you go through the statutory analysis required of this 
15 Court to order disclosure, considering the balancing test 
16 analysis, considering the need for the information against the 
17 reasons to restrict it, clearly the needs outweigh the reason 
18 to restrict it. When you consider, because the court can also, 
19 there's restrictions on disclosure then, redact any of the 
20 sensitive private information. You redact all that, all I'm 
21 left with is facts and the discipline, and that's all I need, 
22 and he's entitled to that. 
23 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you, it says [inaudible] 
24 that why should I not grant his motion to give this information 



























Merit Commission may deny his relief. Then he has to come 
to this court again, get the information and I grant then. 
shouldn't I grant it now? 
MS. WILDE: Because I believe that the Deputy 
Sheriff's Merit Commission has a right to determine how he 




their policies in order to get due process. What records are 
necessary to balance, and they are going to release those 
records that they believe are necessary, and then for the 
Court's information 17-30-20 allows an appeal to the district 
court and they would be reviewing under a different standard. 
Right now before this Court you're reviewing under 
the Government Records Access Management Act and you're 
weighing and balancing Mr. Young's need for the record versus 
the department's statements that these records are private and 
that third parties fourth amendment interest may be contained 
in these records. You're weighing and balancing those 
interests on investigative files, on disciplinary records. I 
believe he is not entitled to the records, nor do I believe, 
and I will be making the same argument to the Deputy Sheriff's 
Merit Commission that they cannot release the actual 
disciplinary records of officers that have not appealed their 
discipline. 
Now they may determine that they can release the 
facts and not the actual records, or they may make some in 
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1 between determination, and the sheriff would have then a right 
2 at the conclusion of the proceedings to appeal to district 
3 court, under 17-30-2, whichever party believes that they are 
4 deprived. But it's a different standard of review. At that 
5 point in time there would be an actual denovo hearing, just 
6 like they did in Lucas, the case cited by Mr. Nakamura. They 
7 determined in Lucas that they had a hearing that did not 
8 comport with due process. They, the, and the, and the court 
9 determined that information that should have, should have been 
10 provided was not. So the same standard utilized in Lucas, 
11 Lucas would be utilized by the District Court in reviewing due 
12 process concerns. 
13 I believe that the due process concerns are 
14 I absolutely premature. We do not, we're, we're presuming a 
15 denial of due process by the Deputy Sheriff's Merit Commission 
16 prior to even the start of the hearing. You know, and I 
17 believe that that is just absolutely premature. 
18 THE COURT: Okay, I'll, I'll, does that take place 
19 every day in criminal cases? That you have to anticipate due 
20 process and get the, the information? 
21 MS. WILDE: Well, let me note for the Court, Your 
22 Honor, which I have not discussed previously, 63-2-207 
23 specifically deals, and this is a GRAMA section talking about 
24 how it, how it is the other records through discovery, etc., 
25 etc., would prevail, and that is what I'm saying. That these 
1 administrative processes cannot be brought in on a GRAMA 
2 request and, and you can't piggy back and say we're being 
3 denied our discovery request in a civil case, so we're going to 
4 come into this Court under a GRAMA request. Your rights under 
5 GRAMA, Mr. Young's rights under GRAMA, my rights under GRAMA, 
6 exist independent of any civil, administrative or criminal 
7 proceeding going on. The purpose of GRAMA is to give access to 
8 public documents. That's independent of whether you actually 
9 have a civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding to go to. 
10 You have a right to public documents. That's the purpose of 
11 GRAMA. It is not designed to circumvent these other civil 
12 discovery processes. 
13 Courts don't want to be in the position, you don't 
14 want to have a hundred people marching into your courtroom on a 
15 GRAMA request saying I'm in a civil slip and fall accident and 
16 I think I need records that have been denied under my, my 
17 request for discovery. Those records are, those types of 
18 concerns are not GRAMA concerns. 
19 THE COURT: Section 63-2-404 of the judicial review 
20 of this, is that a review of the GRAMA? 
21 MS. WILDE: That is a review of GRAMA, and weighing 
22 and balancing Mr. Young's request "I want the records for an 
23 administrative hearing" versus the Department's. 
24 THE COURT: Do you think this comes into play after 



































Well then why can't -
After -
- why, why can't on subsection 8 I 
proceed here today and grant his request? 
MS. WILDE: Because you would need to be making the 
presumption that he's going to be denied due process. We don't 
know that the Merit Commission is not going to give him 
disciplinary files, and I would argue, Your Honor, that 
internal affairs files are irrelevant to his proceedings and 
are not necessary. And it is for the Deputy Sheriff's Merit 
Commission to determine whether those records are necessary for 
due process before them. They understand what those five 
conditions are for the sheriff to establish his burden, 
improving discipline. The sheriff is going to need to put 
people up and testify. It is only the sheriff who can impose 
discipline. There's nothing that prevents Mr. Young from 
cross-examining the sheriff when he gets on the stand to 
testify, or whoever testifies on his behalf about discipline 
imposed by the sheriff's office. There are many ways that he 
can be provided with due process short of receiving these 
records. 
THE COURT: And the only way he can come back before 
this Court is to prove that he's denied due process then? 









































determinati on. Right. 
you, Your Honor. 
Now Mr. Nakamura, 
/. Anything? 
this is your motion. 
MR. NAKAMURA: I appreciate that, Your Honor, and I 
appreciate it that the extent, the extent of the effort to 
which you're going to, to cover this issue here. 
Her statement that we're not entitled to this 
information because by giving it you would be presuming that 
there would be a violation of his due process rights at the 
hearing is wholly incorrect, and this is the reason. It's not 
based upon a presumption. It's based upon a right to have that 
information. Just like any other party who has a due process 
right that's being taken away has a right to information before 
they go to the hearing where that's challenged. In a criminal 
proceeding, pre-trial a defendant has a right, a due process 
right, to the State's evidence. Has a right to it. It's not 
based on presumption of a violation of his due process rights 
in trial. That may be the premise of it, but the reason for a 
pre-trial is a right based upon the proceeding that he or she 
is headed to. They want to contend. 
Well, when you get there hey, you can protect his due 
process rights by cross examining the sheriff. You can call 
any other deputies that you may have wind of who's involved in 
43 
1 something like this. You can subpoena them. Now if that's not 
2 a fishing expedition I don't know what would be. I don't know. 
3 I wouldn't have any information from which to cross examine 
4 him. I'd have to go all over the board with that. 
5 Furthermore, I don't know the specific deputies. I don't know 
6 the, the real facts of those other cases. I'm hearing innuendo 
7 and rumor, and that's it. I don't have solid information that 
8 this deputy was involved in this conduct, resulting in this 
9 discipline. That's indeed what the information I'm requesting 
10 has. 
11 And, and I guess what I'm, what is a very, troubling 
12 to me, is that somehow the defense is saying, Well, you know, 
13 there's a way in which you can kind of, in the back end protect 
14 the rights. That's not the way the system works, Your Honor. 
15 I'm entitled to this information up front. 
16 THE COURT: I've heard that. 
17 MR. NAKAMURA: And it's, it'll be gone by then, and 
18 I'm willing to, and there, if we, if the Court would like extra 
19 briefing on that I'd be happy to do it. I'm not aware of any 
20 provision that allows this Court, or any other court, to review 
21 a Merit Commission's determination on access to records or not. 
22 What it does allow is for us to review the conduct of the Merit 
23 Commission after it's done. That's an appellate review, but 
24 it's limited to the record. 
25 J THE COURT: Well, let me indicate to you that the 
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1 Court did spend considerable time yesterday in going over these 
2 statutes and looking at them, and I'll, I really confess that 
3 they're not, not my every day reading of these things. You 
4 don't run into this every day as far as sitting on the bench. 
5 It's something more of a specialized area, and I got a fairly 
6 good knowledge of them, and you certainly enlightened, given me 
7 more enlightenment here today as far as this Merit Commission 
8 and the GRAMA statutes and so forth are concerned. 
9 And my immediate reaction in this case has been that 
10 the, the administrative remedies have not been exhausted and 
11 that the plaintiff should go back as far as the Merit 
12 Commission is concerned and have a hearing and yet I cannot get 
13 around the basic understanding that in any case a person is 
14 entitled to due process up front. I can't understand how in a 
15 criminal case a person can go to trial without receiving due 
16 process and receive the discovery and the information, and even 
17 if I deny the request, allow it go back, then it's just going 
18 to come back here before, again, if due process is alleged and 
19 then, of course, then he has the burden of proving that due 
20 process was not granted. 
21 I'll/ the Court is of the opinion and I so rule that 
22 the plaintiff is entitled to the records asked for and I 
23 specifically say, as asked for, with the material redacted. I 
24 think the right of privacy is more, more important in this 



























any information that is going to disclose who these infer, the 
other officers were, I, of course I want that definitely out. 
I want it strictly as to what the charge was and the result 
and, and if it comes down to cases that are sensitive or 
there's been one case where it would be revealing immediately 
to fellow officers as to who they're talking about, I don't 
want that given. If I have to have an in camera hearing, then 
so be it. But I'll, I want the right of privacy protected. 
MR. NAKAMURA: And, Your Honor, I don't know if we can 
build this into the order or not, and I appreciate that, but, 
you know, what we're, what we're doing here I think is going to 
protect that. Number one, I'm willing to enter into a 
protective order to preclude the dissemination of this. But 
more importantly, the hearing before the commission we're not 
going to agree to be public. So it's not going to be public, 
and so, you know, and that's I guess, you know, the other 
reason behind this is that I'm not, I'm not interested in 
private information and the proceeding that we're going into, 
where this information is going to be used is not public, so -
THE COURT: Well, I'm just saying that I think the 
right of privacy is of greater interest to protect than the due 
process to plaintiff at this point, and I want that protected. 
Who's going to prepare an Order? 
j MR. NAKAMURA: I'd be happy to prepare it. 





MR. NAKAMURA: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I'm 
going to be making a motion for fees in this, to be awarded in 
this case, under the GRAMMA provision that allows prevailing 
to, prevailing party to be awarded attorney's fees necessary, 
or that were incurred in perfecting this appeal, and I can, if 
the Court wants to spend time on that or hear that or we just, 
if the Court just wants to entertain motions when they're filed 
we can do that as well. 
THE COURT: Well, you make the motion and I will give 
you a hearing. 
MR. NAKAMURA: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
Agency. 
DECISION ON IN-CAMERA REVIEW OF 
COMPARABLE DISCIPLINARY CASES. 
Case No. 00-1 
A request for the Deputy Sheriffs-Merit Commission (hereinafter Commission) to 
perform an in-camera review of disciplinary cases comparable to the circumstances of the 
Brent Young appeal was made on February 6, 2000 and March 12, 2001 by the 
Appel lant. The Commission met on Wednesday, April 1 1 , 2001 to perform the in-camera 
review. Commission members J . Richard Catten and Jill Carter were present. The 
Commission, having reviewed the disciplinary records furnished by the Sheriff 's Off ice, 
hereby submits the fol lowing findings: 
FINDINGS 
1 . That the records provided by the Sheriff 's Office appeared to be complete and 
included cases relating back to the beginning of the current Sheriff 's administration. 
2. That the none of the cases reviewed by the Commission are relevant to the above 
capt ioned case and, therefore, would be of no value to the Appellant in the defense of 
this appeal, 
ORDER 
It is hereby ordered by the Commission that none of the records reviewed by the 
Commission shall be released to the Appellant. 
08/07/01 TUE 15:11 FAX 801 468 2172 SLCo PERSONNEL 1^ 1004 
DATED this 2% day of md^ _, 2001. 
Catten, Chair 
ialazar, Vic^fchair Paul D. S e-C
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Sheriff Aaron Kennard 
Salt Lake County Sheriff 
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Susan Biesele 
Human Resource Director 
2001 South State Street # S 2 7 0 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 9 0 
Brent D. Young 
1971 E. 3080 S. 
Salt Lake, UT 84106 
Blake A. Nakamura 
142 E. 200 S.# Suite 3 1 2 
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1 PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
2 
3 63-2-101- Short title. 
4 Thli chapter i s known as the "Government Records Access and 
5 Management Act." 
e 
7 83-2-102. Legis lat ive intent . 
8 (1) In enacting th i s act , the Legislature recognizes two 
9 IwvdajEonWl constitutional rights i 
10 )£e^ »he JfjLght o l pAXyalgy fa "frftlafcleaP ee posaenal Jato 
1 1 yfrtefWfcfrU- *-^w^—*^ * — ^ » ^ M — — J " » * . — * 
12 
13 
14 is 'frthtwQy •qgyfnwttWe tt?Ufri«t7 
16 121 ffh? iBqlalaUzs algg yegggniiefi ft PttfrUc WliffY tat?mti An 
17 allowing government to treat certain records conf ident ial ly , 
18 pa speci f ied in thiy ?hapWi i?y th? WMl9 OT9ti -
IS (42) I t i s the intent of the Legislature toi 
20 f<y •eew.felleh faig infogmatiofi praotlooo fco proMont abuoo of 
21 yoesonal information by goveriwonfral <H»frittioo while 
22 yreiieoiiing tho public's right of oacy end roaconable 
23 a0000c to unroefcrifltod evbiis rooordo; and 
24 (b) provkdo guidelines of eeomioss- *e •go^ornroont Information 
25 end privacy of poraoival infegmetien sonciofronfr with 
26 nationwide ettai*dasd» » 
27 JjQ) promote the public's right of easv and reasonable access 
28 to unrestricted public records; 
29 $h) provide clrna^ standards specifying those conditions 
30 under which the public eelAey interest in allowing the 
31 confidential treatment of records outweighs the public's 
32 ensqstrt In ass*??; 
33 l£l prevent abuse of confidentiality bv governmental 
34 ? P U * 1 « frY POTHetteBQ confidential treatment of ycortft 
35 only ae provided in this Chapter; 
36 fd^ provide guidelines for both disclosure and 
37 confidentiality of government records, which are based 
38 on the equitable weighing of the pertinent Interests, 39 a™? which, age gpgpiytm "W rwUgnw,Wg p^mfasti? at 
4$ information practices; and 
41 <*) e s tabl i sh fa ir and reasonable records management 
42 P M P U C W i
 A 1 ±* /) t L. 
43
 f 0 it f ()L tyh^L HtiOLf+eL 
44 63-2-103. Definit ions . _ > ^ t^"!) -+- /7o4- JLtco* 
45 As used in t h i B j ^ a p t S T T < ^ ^ f *"^0 ' 
46 H i ^Audlt^rfiSans a systematic examination of financial records 
47 for the purpose of determining their accuracy or the 
48 ftffCTWPY <?l rplttttv rW9rt> QF flta;ement;g, 9? a *ygtemat;Lc 
49 examlnaticn of program procedures and operations for the 
H.B. 400, (as proposed), General Session (1992), Chapter 280, Laws of Utah (1992) 
pages 2-8 and 20-60 omitted. 
Section 63-2-201 
1 from a governmental entity, and/if the records are contained 
2 in files that do not contain redorda that are exempt from 
3 disclosure, the governmental entity mayi 
4 (a) provide the requester with the facilities for copying 
5 the requested records and require that the requeater 
€ sake the copies himself; or 
? (b) allow the requester to provide his own copying 
8 facilities and personnel to make the copies at the / 
9 governmental entity's offices/^and valve the fees for j/ 
10 ^ copying the records. y * 
12 fIOWA governmental entity that owns a copyright or patent / 
13 affecting a record*/ and that offers the copyrighted or / 
14 patented record for sale may control by ordinance or policy 
15 the access, duplication, and distribution of the material 
16 based on terms the governmental entity considers to be in 
17 the public interest.Wwothing in this chapter shall be 
18 construed to limit oiHunpair the rights or protections «/ 
19 granted to the governmental entity under federal copyright 
20 or patent law as a result of its ownership of the copyright 
21 or patent. 
22 
23 63-2-202. Access to private, oonfidontial controlled, end 
24 protected documents. 
25 (1) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a private 
26 record that ie olaoslflod privevo to: 
27 (a) the subject of the record; 
28 (b) the parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor 
29 who is the subject of the record; 
30 (c) the legal guardian of a legally incapacitated individual 
31 who is the subject of the record; 
32 (d) any other individual who: 
33 (!) has a power of attorney from the subject of the 
34 record; or 
35 (li) submits a notarised release from the subject of 
36 the record or his legal representative dated no 
37 more than 30 days before the date the request is 
38 made; or 
39 (e) any person who Has s to whom the record must be provided 
40 pursuant to court order as provided in subsection (71 
41 signed by a judgo from a Utah sour*, efthoc then a 
•y 
42 * Government interests request that the following language be 
43 substituted: MA governmental entity that owns a copyright er
 A 
44 patent, trade secret, or other form of intellectual property and 
45 that offers the same sffeeting a roeord,—and the* efiers %ho 
46 eopygightod o* petontod sooesd for sale or license may...." Media 
47 interests request that the word "access" be deleted as follows: 
48 " •. .may control by ordinance or policy the seeees, duplication... . * 
9
 i.,.4 ^ .Ts< " tyf* 
Section 63-2-202 
jeetiee ef the petea eoeytj eg e fodssal eoe** ef n' 
eonpetaet jueiedietisw te the aw taut that the eeeerd ^ ^ 
deals with a wetter i* eontrovearay tv>f which tho eouyfr j / \ * 
has Jiu»lediotiafi aftss tho seest has eoneldosod the . )&i^&4 j ^ 
soglts of the geaerd sequost. VQ/ (-^ |>/* ' 
(a) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a / 
iftP^tfj;|^4 As eleaaifiad eo»fidonfci^l ^ controlled record 
(i) a physician, paychologiat, or-eertlTQ^-social 
worker upon submission of a notarixecreleaae 
frota the subject of the record that is dated no 
store than 30 days prior to the date the request 
is made and a signed acknowledgment of the terms 
of disclosure of eenfidontial gontrolled 
information as provided by Subsection (b); and 
{11} any person who has a to whom the record must be 
provided pursuant to court order as provided in ^ > 
»T?frwU9ft PI sigtvod by a judyo fws* a Utah ""Z/'^Vu* 
eomrty ether than a j*otioo of tho poaoo eosstf yfy »^ 
er a federal oourtof eonpotont jurisdiction to lr^ / *? 
the extern* that the reoord deals wish a mattog Invi^^
 0 
controversy ever whioh the oourt has jurisdiction 
after the eeust hso oeneaderod tho e>oi?ita of the 
goserd request« 
(b) A person who receives a record from a governmental 
entity in accordance with Subsection (2)(a)(1) may not 
disclose confidential controlled information from that 
record to any person, including the subject of * the 
record * 
II %t\tt* H ftfrf* *hftn ?"« street gjf g prjvg^e Q?T coptCTU^d 
record, the portion of the record that pertains to another 
fttfrlm »ft*iU fr* g?qpeffate4 ttW th« P9JTU9* &** thf 
requester is entitled to inspect. 
Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a 
protected record that is oiaaeifiod mm pgotootod tot 
(a) the person who submitted the infowwation 1* the record; 
(b) any other individual whoi 
(i) has a power of attorney fro» the subjoot ef the 
«eeee* ftU ffrt»fr»POTWIi ,.»ytaTfltntPl entj^Qfi. 
Or PQlitJCill ffyfr3ivm<W*f *ftW*« ^ e y e s t * yqy* 
sought to frs pg<rt?cfre<a PY %\* pyyte^fd 
glass i f i saUgfl ; or ( i i ) submits a notarised release from {lie subjeet ef 
tho lrooord a l l frf tho persona
 f governmental 
. f l f taUft i PT p o e t i c a l MMiYiU9Pi *h9Eft 
Interests were sought to be protected by the 
protected c las s i f i ca t ion , or M e fra* thSig leg** 
representatives, dated no more than 30 days prior 
to the date the request i s made; or 
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Section 63-2-202 
1 (c) any person who hag a to whom the record must be provided 
2 greWHM* t9 court order as provided in subsection f 71 
3 eiynod by a judgo iron a Utah eesrtj -ether than a 
4 jestiee ef tho eoeoo oourt, eg a lodoral ooegt ef 
5 esispetofit jurisdiction te the eatant that tho eeeegd 
6 ek>ale »»ith a mattog in controversy ovsg whiek the oourt 
7 hao jurisdiction after tho eenst has eensidorod the 
8 sprite ef the gooosd goqecat* 
9 f4+ 
10 XJJJ. A governmental entity may disclose a private, controlled or 
11 protected record olaosifled pg*MatOj oenfirientialj er 
12 pgefcootod to another governmental entity, another atatev the 
13 United States, or a foreign government only aa provided by 
14 Section 63-2-206-
1' (S* Before releasing a privatef controlled, or protected record 
17 elaosifiod pgivato, oorvfldontialr or protootod, the 
18 governmental entity shall obtain evidence of the requester's 
19 identity. 
20 -f-6+ lathing in this aootion prshibltc a gOMognmontal outlay from 
21 dioolocing a rooogd to pogaono other than those llaaod in 
22 Cebaootionc (1)# (3), aivd (3)if the fevogfunonteal entity 
23 -ylotogauiftOP that diooloauga la in the eublio lutoyoeti 
24 r7i9lA governmental entity shall disclose a record pursuant to 
25 the terms of a court order stoned bv a judoe from a court of 
26 ^ competent jurisdiction, provided that: 
2? i SAX the record deals with a matter in controversy over which 
28 the court has jurisdiction: 
29 ^ Xkl the court has considered the merits of the request for 
31 <(l X£l the court has c?fls|c>p^ a^ t W\e?e ftppr9P*iUt*t M»ti* 
32 pyPY^f i<?n fay Uff l i t« ,U9P* 91ft frh* ttfff frirf, 4jirffclt9*¥re frf 
33 TN> r^coyd fa
 ?r^ey jo p m r n Prtvfl9v inttrtftt in $hf 34 pa^f 9iE PrtYfrt? par fipnttreUtti r*99rti»i frysjneya 
35 conf ident ia l i ty Interests in the case of T*COT4* 
36
 n gm*<^gti gmter SgsUsn ^3-2-30^111 anc* (3i. os ths 
37 / hi public Interest In the case of other protected records; 
38 K-~SjM to the extent; tlye jpfcpyd \B prgpfrty PlMftljEUd p r i v a t e 
39 sftnwUjti 9i ,pg9t§stf4i tftt tntwtttf gangling i g c ^ f i . 
40 considering l imitations thereon, outwich the interes ts 
41 f A ) favoring yeftrtrtUffi 9f «9ce»?t JgSP 
42 (jr/iJfcl t9 the extent excess jp pmrj.ctged by a r^flf, prtfrr, 
43 7 s tatute oy rtg^UT49^ yafrspyed to jr\ Smlfflft 63-2-
44 2Plf3U*Of tft* CTWtt tW OTtlWrttT liufrpfftdep* 9f tfrjs 
45 jfrct %p pyder disclosure, 
46 111 i l l A governmental ent i ty may disclose or authorise 
47 disclosure of private or controlled records for research. 
48 purposes i f the governmental entity: 
49 (1) determines that the research purpose cannot 
50 reasonably be accomplished without use or 11 
8«ction 63-2-202 
* disclosure of the Information to the researcher 
3 Ull determlnea that the proposed reaearch ia bona 
4 fide, and tftat th« vfllue 9* th« rff'ff^ ygh 
5 PUtw»iqha the infringement qppn pergonal Privacy? 
6 liiil recuires the researcher to assure the integrity, 
7 confidentiality, and security of the records and 
8 f*** t° remove or destroy the individual 
9 Identifiers associated with the records as soon 
10 as the purpose of the research project has been 
i i flccgpiplliiiedi 
12 jjy) prohibits the researcher from disclosing the 
13 record In individually id«wt€TfTable form, excent v 
14 as provided in Subsectlofr-f SUblHff trom using—- (YJl b) 
15 the record for purposes other tXan the research 
16 approved bv the governmenta1 entity: 
17 m. aecures from the researcher a written statement 
18 of, hill mderstandlng of and, agreement fro ti>f 
19 conditlona of this aubaectlon and his 
20 undemanding that viQ-laUw of the torn* of tM» 
21 agreement may subject him to criminal prosecution 
22 under Section 63-2-B01. 
23 Ski A researcher mav disclose a record in individually 
24 Identifiable form if the record is disclosed for the 
25 purpose of auditing or evaluating the research program 
2* and no subsequent use or disclosure of the record in 
27 individually Identifiable form will be made bv the 
28 auditor or evaluator except as provided bv this section. 
29 (c\ A governmental entity may require indemnification as a 
30 condition of permitting gtmrgh under ttut •wbgegtign-
32 €3-2-203. Fees. __ 
33 {1) A governmental entity may charge a^re'asonable fee, 
34 to cover the governmental entity's aetuai^cost of 
35 duplicating a record or compiling-S-Tecord in a form other 
36 than that maintained by the governmental" entity^.5 
37 H I TS99 shall fef •gtflPUfhfd *• follows i 
18 (a) Governmental entities with budgets established by the 
9
 Government Interests have proposed the following 
substitute: "A oo^ernS8n*al entity may charge a reasonable fee^ 
" 4ect—to subsection f 4 u to cover the governmental entity's 
actual cost, o^k4a&rchlno /for a record, duplicating a record^. 
eeoxeaatlnofe rec&nr«ewraifant to Sectlon6 3-2-307. or compiling a 
form other than that maintained by the governmental 
ireuant to Section 63-2-201f 8 H b K ?n addition,! a, 
governmental entity mav charge a reasonable fee to cover the 
47 governmental entity's actual coat of review, when the record is 
48 f t m t W l fog 9 commercial purpose." 
is 
Section 63-2*203 
1 Legislature eub«>oot te Ceet4en 63 38 3 ahall eatabliah 
2 fees Moing a eeet fermute dotogminod by end tn y^jrjft^  
3 eonjunction with the Office el Planning and gwdgot a»d rjJD oT 
4 the Pivision of ?inaaeo through the budget process.. • A* V 
5 <b) Political subdivisions ahall eatabliah feea by ordinance \ Q \ 
6 or written formal policy adopted bv the governing body. 
7 <cj The judiciary ahall eatabliah feea by rulea of the .
 fc>,V l4l 
. ^ »-l«U»««U. ^ V 
10 /31 A governmental entity may fulfill a request without charge' y p ^ s f i 
11 when it determines thati \rJ^ 
12 (a) releasing the record primarily benefits rhe public v^ 
13 rather than an individual a person? or 
14 (b) the individual requesting the record ia the eubject of 
15 the record, or an Individual specified in Section 63-2-
i s ?P?(i> oy f ? } t a* apwgpgatft^* 1? +£* 
18 M l A governmental entity may not charge a fee for? 
19 {a) reviewing a record to determine whether it ia subject to 
20 disclosure; or 
21 (b) inspecting a record.4 
22
 +**?<*} / 
23 Xii u^Ail money r o o d Mod by a steto agoney to O O V O J tho aetual r 
24 ooct of duplicating a rooord or oompillng a rooord in a form 
25 othog than that maintained by tho stafco.agoney fees received 
26 yndfr this section bv a governmental entity subject to 
2? subsection f 2 w a i ahall be retained by the^afato agonoy 
28 governmental entity as a dedicated credit Ipkhomm funds / 
29 shall be used to recover the actual cost ana expensed 
30 incurred by the state ageeey governmental entity in 
31 providing the requested record or record aeries. 
32 * Government interests have proposed the following languages 
33 l & ± If $ Ttqw»«* Is made fpy a npfl-ftfflnq>ercjlal p\OT9??t * * 
34 governmental entity may not charge a fee fori 
35 (a) xil yovlowing its review of a record to determine whether it 
36 la subject to disclosure; « * 
37 « $ * * 1 1 1 1 inspecting a geeoad sealing foy a W M r * i If 
38 jgsa frhan oi|e froqy p?y ,rtgyt#tt 9f 39 i l l l i »«qr»q«UM * rreort. If l?w than wre ho^ r ires 
40 request. 
41 I M fpy purpoaqg p* thj,g s ^ s e c t ^ r ^ ftU CTWIIttf sqtoftj^yl by ,§ 
42 requester to a s ingle governmental ent i ty within a 30 day 
43 period shal l be considered a s ingle request. 
44 l £ l ft qoytnmTO^-Jt en t i ty fray ftp* Sh«q* & lf« for s e a l i n g j?Q3r 
45 a record or for aegreoatlnq a record pursuant to Section S3-2-
46 307 i f the Individual requesting the record i s the subject of 
47 the record, or an individual specified in Section 63-2-202J I) 
48 pr (21,. 
13 
3 If f « « are i m w c u d to «xc«ed sso or If the raouaaf r ha a 
4 mrt r#i<il <^ff f r?m pr«vloviff r«qvtg*f. Anv pypftl4 »*>QM?n in 
5 « « » « of *»*» due ahall ba rttumid to tha remoter. 
£ rg\ 
7 ill *hia taction doea not altar. r^*x:H5r~>^duca apply *e fees 
8 aatablishad by othar eaa*Mttae^lecrlalation A *p 
10 63-2-204. Requests — Time linit for^ rirapoinfa and extraordinary 
11 circumstances« 
12 (1) A parson making a request for a racord shall furnish the 
13 governmental entity with a written request containing his 
14 name, nailing address, daytime telephone number XI 
15 javallabfr|# and a description of the records requested that 
16 identifies the record with reaaonable specificity* — & 
17 feMOFWuontal outlay stay goeoend so aw anal goeuost or othe* 
18 I91SW* f»fr-*-fyi 
** soaeiaod in Gubseeaien m h*% e*sh lesponoo ch»U *0% be 
21 (2) A governmental entity may make rules in accordance with 
22 Chapter 46a, Title 63, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, 
23 specifying where and to whom requests for acceaa shall be 
24 directed. 
25 (3) ,<el gneopa ea provided in SabeootAea (4)f a gau's»iiiio*ial 
26 entity oha11 soapend to e eoaoada roquoat no lator than 
27 ton business daye affray aeeeiviiie; the roquoat byi Within 
28 10 dava after receiving a written request, or within 5 
29 dftYg rf receiving * yrtfflm,imm i-t th? yeguestpr 
30 demonstrates that expedited response to the request of 
31 the record benefit* the public rather than a person, the 
32 qyytpipiTOm W U t V JhfrU, r«gP9ftd p? tfr* request; fry? 
33 (#1) approving the request and providing the record; 
34 fMi ) denying the request; 
35 f*lli \ notifying the requester that it does not maintain 
36 the record and providing, if known, the name and 
37 address of the governmental entity that does 
38 maintain the record; or 
39 (4iv) notifying the requester that because of one of 
40 the extraordinary circumstances listed in 
41 Subsection <fS4»(4). it cannot immediately approve 
42 or deny the request, describing the circumstance 
43 relied upon, and specifying the earliest time and 
44 date when the records will be available. 
45 Xbl fltxv oeraon who requests a record to obtain information 
46 for t rteSY n SW9tt fol WWaCPUoq oy byoadsm *9 
47 the general public is presumed to be actino to benefit 
4* ttVft PVfrU? ratfrey %h*P E Pqg*9fti 
43 ft) If a sequester doawnetyatoo that ho la a mombor of the nowo 













































pebllo gat-hog %hen an individual, the fSMegnmsnfcal entity 
•hall soogend \o a sesesdo seqeos* no Into* than five 
feuclnooo dayo eftor eooolving the eeqeesi» 
The following circumatancee constitute "extraordinary 
circumstances- that allow a governmental antlty to delay 
approval or denial by an additional nemboe »f days period of 
l£ffl£ as specified in Subsection 63-2-204 4*+(5\ if the 
governmental entity determines that due to the extraordinary 
circumstances it cannot respond within the time limits 
provided in Subsection (3) or{4)t 
(a) another governmental entity is using the record, in 
which case the originating governmental entity shall 
Aiwiiodiafcely promptly request that the governmental 
entity currently in possession return the record; 
(b) another governmental entity Is using the record as part 
of an audit and returning the record before the 
completion of the audit would impair the conduct of the 
audit; 
(c) the request is for a voluminous quantity of records; 
(d) the governmental entity is currently processing a large 
number of records requests; 
{«} the request requires the governmental entity to review a 
large number of records to locate the records requested? 
(f) the decision to release a record involves legal issues 
requiring analysis of statutes, rules, ordinances, 
regulationsf or case laws 
(g) separating public leforaaslon feem private# eonfidaniiial 
eg pgotootod infsrrnafrien secreoatinp information that 
the requester is entitled to inspect from information 
that the requester is not entitled to inspect requires 
extensive editing; or 
(h) eopasatoinq pubtio Angogtsation €eosi pglvasoj asnfldeniial 
or protootod information segregating information that 
the requester is entitled to inspect fFom information 
tfftat i?he rfq\;ef%*? ja ngV iliUUfd 19 *»«?••« requires 
computer programming^ 
If a t*****^^ one of the 
extraordinary circumstances "listed in Subsection <f£4-H \ 
precludes approval or denial within the time specified in 
Subsection {3) er •(4)^  the following time limits apply to 
Government interests have requested the addition of the 
[x*gx*phi * n i any effigy *sig?nt sr »xtraor<UftftrY 
a that DrWent 
LlfgmffVfrn<?es that pB tot Uftftlv rwwntt %° * r«qm»*t wftere ^ f OTBcy ****d gfcMItw ,ttwtnte Iwrtwd* twwigy and XH m ^ n t y %g 
•respond is assented in good faith, and is not designed 
\rhr^^4m^4^r-ist delay the response.* 
15 
Section 63-2-204 
1 the extraordinary circumstances* 
2 (a) for claims under Subsection «f4f(4Hal, the governmental 
3 entity currently in possession of the record shall 
4 return the record to the originating entity within five 
5 business days of the request for the return unless 
6 returning the record would impair the holder's work; 
7 (b) for claims under Subsection *34»MHbi. the originating 
8 governmental entity shall notify the requester when 
9 record is available for inspection and copying; 
10 (c) for claims under Subsections f ^ M H O , (d), and (e); 
11 the governmental entity shall x 
12 (i) disclose the publie records that it has locate 
13 which the requester is entitled to inspect: 
14 (ii) provide the requester with an estimate of the 
15 amount of time it will take to finish the 
17 (iii) complete the eeaseh york and disclose %fe» 
18 eoquootori those records that the requester is 
19 entitled to inspect as soon as reasonably 
20 possible?"* 
21 (d) for claims under Subsection (5){f), the governmental 
22 entity shall either approve or deny the request within 
23 five days after the response (time designated for the 
24 original request has expired yV 
25 <e) for claims under Subsection f5)(g), the governmental 
26 entity shall fulfill the request within 15 business days 
27 from the date of the original request; or 
28 (f) for claims under Subsection (5){h), the governmental 
29 entity shall complete its programming and disclose the 
30 requested records as soon as reasonably possible. 
32 JL£l*f/lf * request for access is submitted to an office of a 
33 *-//governmental entity other than that specified by rule in 
34 accordance with Subsection (2), the office shall immodialkfly 
35 promptly forward the request to the appropriate pffice. Vlf 
36 the request is forwarded imwsdiatoly promotlvjghe time u~" 
37 limit for zMponmm begins when the record is "received by the 
38 office designated by rule. 
39 * Government interests have proposed that the extensions for 
40 legirir^Sarysis and for segxegrK^ should be subject to 
41 tha^U^s soon as reasonably possible** standard, along with the new 
42 exigent"CllLiiae-trtrnceB extension pyopnnert In^footnote 7. 
43 f Government interests have proposed to add the tern "££ 
44 segregated" at this point* This is related to footnote 8. 
45 ** Government interests have proposed to delete this and the 
46 following two paragraphs. This proposal relates to footnote 8. 
Section 63-2-204 
1 «** 
2 17) If the governmental entity fails to provide the requested 
3 records or issue a denial within the specified time period, 
4 that failure is considered the equivalent of a determination 
B denying access to the records. 
1 63-2-205. Denials, 
8 (1) If the governisental entity denies the request in whole or 
9 part, it shall ie»« 4 %*Um» jToKih %e Iho *oq**n*,*M M 
12 (2) The notice of denial shall contain the following 
13 information i 
14 {a) e description of the record or portions of the record to 
15 which access was denied, provided that the description 
16 does not disclose private, eetifidoefclal controlled, or 
17 protected information; 
18 (b) citations to the provisions of this chapter, court rule 
19 or order, another state statute, federal statute, or 
20 federal regulation that exempt the record or portions of 
21 the record from disclosure, provided that the citations 
22 do not disclose private, oonfidontial controlled, or 
23 protected information; 
24 (cj a statement that the requester has the right to appeal 
25 the denial to the chief administrative of f icer of the 
26 governmental ent i ty |hrt fthon Jtff^gifthm »ho eeeordc 
27 seawrffrtroo er dla^trlgV #eert; and 
28 {d} h brio! emmaey *t t&ti *$pG±lii ywo&tQ*, the time l imits 
29 'for f i l ing an appeal/and the name and business address 
30 of the chief administrative off icer of the governmental 
31 entity. 
32 (3) Unless otherwise required by a court or agency of competent 
33 jurisdiction, a governmental entity may not destroy or give 
34 / ttpj££i&<^yfOf any record to which access was denied until 
•^SeperTod In which to bring anjappeal has expired or the 35 lct"~ 3* ^ fT end of the^sppeale processf including judicial appeal 37 " 
38 €3-2-206. Sharing records. 
39 (1) A governmental entity may provide a record eorioe that is 
40 elascifiod private, controlled, or protected wndor Section 
41 <3 3 303j eenfidonfrlal undo* fioofcion S3 2 303» ppotooted 
42 eeder Biibsoefclen t3 2 301 (1) s* (0) to another governmental 
43 entity, a e# government-managed corporation, tfhe federal 
44 yovernment, or another state if the requesting govoromontal 
45 entity er fovornmon* managed eorpeyatleei 
46 (a) serves as a repository or archives for purposes of '( 
47 historical preservation, administrative maintenance, or : • 
48 destruction;
 w •* 
49 (b) enforces*. litiqa&mJ or investigates civil or criminal 8%<^ 




(c) is authorised by state statute to conduct an audit and 
the record is needed for that purpoaex_fi£ 
ISLi is one that collects information for presentence. 
probationarattpr parole purposed 
(2) A governmental entity may provide a private or controlled 
record or record series *hat is slaesiiiod psivaso mat 
oenfidoneial to another governmental entity^ j^Bt 
government-managed corporation, the fedaral governmentr or 
W another state if the requesting go»agnroon*a* entifcyr ^x , { 
21 (a) certifies that the record or record series is^ecessary^y *f7if" 
12 to the performance of the governmental entity* a duties * 
13 end functions; 
14 (b) certifies that the record or record series will be used 
15 for a purpose similar to the purpose for which the 
16 information in the record or record series was collected 
1? or obtained; and 
II (c) certifies that the use of the record or record series 
If produces a public benefit that outweighs the individual 
20 privacy right that protects the record or record series. 
21 (3) A governmental entity may provide a record or record series 
22 that is elaseifioti protected under Subsection 63-2-3p4-^Tp" 
23 or (2) to another governmental entity, a oovernmsntj^anaged\ ) &^~ 
2* corporation, the federal,government, or another stalte XTT—*\A*-_, ^ V/^ 
25 (a) the record i& necessary>to the performance of the JJ 
26 eovommemal^requesttno entity's duties and functions; 
27 or 
28 (b) the record will be used for a purpose similar to the 
29 purpose for which the information in the record or 
30 record series was collected or obtained. 
31 (syombogoti iwon eld numbs* 6) 
32 JLii^A governmental entity shall provide a private, eenfidonmial 
33 controlled, or protected record to another governmental 
34 entity^uK government-managed corporation, the federal 
35 . government, or another state if the requesting entity; 
36 <v (ar) is entitled by law to Inspect the record; or 
37 tt p**j LB required to inspect the record BB a condition of 
38 participating in a state or federal program or for 
39
 7rj receiving state or federal funds. 
40 ,(jr>vBefore disclosing a record or record series under this 
41 section to another governmental entity, another state, the 
42 United States$ or a foreign government, the originating 
43 governmental entity shall * 
44 t t*) inform the recipient of the record's classification and 
45 the accompanying restrictions on access fend 
** <Mb) it th* **<;LQiw)% I* no* ft qpYsnwKrrtgl fnUtv to «Msh 
47 this chanter applies, obtain the recipient'* written 
48 agreement, which mav be by mechanical or electronic 
49 transmission, that it will abide by those restrictions 
50 on access unless a statute, federal regulation, or 
18 
2 interstate agreement otherwise governs tne snoring ox 
2 the record or record series. 
3 j*+n**X>ero4 ir+m aid amass* 4) 
* £ ffi ttaswlihs^andlftsj Sebeesaieti {2) a A governmental entity may 
5 disclose a record to anothar state, tha Unitad States, or a 
f foreign government for tha reasons llatad in Subsections 
7 (1), (2), and (3) without complying with the procedures of 
8 ittftgreU?** f?l QT 1$) " disclosure is authorized by 
9 executive agreement, treaty, federal statute, compact, 
10 federal regulation, or state statute. 
11 (3 111 A governmental entity receiving a record pursuant to this 
1* Motion is subject to the same restrictions on disclosure of 
13 ttt m?riftl 99 thv grlslM^ng mtttvi 
14 «4*p _ 
15 i H l j Htotwithetanding any other provision of this aectionj if a 
16 Htore specific court rule or order, state statute, federal 
17 statute, or federal regulation prohibits or requires sharing 
18 information, that rule, order, statute or federal regulation 
19 controls. 
20 +8+ 
21 % f9^ The proulolone ef thio sooaion do net apply *o following 
22 records may not be shared under this section: 
23 (a) records held by the Utah State Tax Commission that 
24 pertain to any person and that are gathered under 
23 authority of Title 59, Revenue and Taxation; 
2$ <b) records held by the TJtah Division of^Oil, Gas and Mining 
27 that pertain to any person and Uyjpcare gathered under \j 
28 authority of Chapter S, Title 40, Board and Division of 
29 Oil, Gas and Mining; and 
30 (c) records of publicly funded libraries as described in 
31 Subsection 63-2-302 (5). 
32 (\ flQ] Ifrgprta th** M T <wrA<IW^ ? r relate ,fr? ft violation gf ^aw fry 
33 i T W I W H L w t t y ffjlffsoi may fry fllaglpsed Xft{A\ 
35 VV^ 
36 n Government interests have proposed the addition of a new 
37 Section 63-2-207i Requests bv forty Litigants. A request bv a 
38 party l i t i g a n t acalnst the s ta te , a p o l i t i c a l subdivision, or other: 
39 governmental ent i ty for records related to the subject m r t e r of 
40 the UUOTtjon f**&U fttt fre Hfrlfct tg g m t o n s g?-2-?Q3l thfQftgh 
4i ,§2-2-29$ tort ftoU be qgytnwwi fry **>* genmm* prgrHJoq rt .ft** 
42 state or federal rules of civil, criminal or administrative 
43 prpcedVire*
 l K s 4 
•*/» - ...Jr..* °$£»" H" 
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ADDENDUM F 
2-4-06.03 Responsibility and Authority for Discipline 
(1) Sheriff 
The Sheriff may impose any major discipline measure deemed appropriate, 
after complying with prescribed procedural requirements of merit or career 
service regulations. 
(2) Division Commanders 
(a) Division Commanders have the authority to issue verbal and written 
warnings. 
(b) Division Commanders may initiate major disciplinary action by 
submitting written charges and recommendations of misconduct to the 
Sheriff with recommendations for proposed disciplinary action. 
(c) Any discipline initiated against a member as a result of a secondary 
assignment, will be completed by the secondary assignment Division 
Commander. 
(d) After meeting with the member, and prior to submitting any major 
disciplinary action recommendation to the Sheriff, the Division 
Commander will consult with the Bureau Chief, the Human Resources 
Manager and the Captains Board. The Division Commander is required 
to report to the Sheriff in writing that the above consultations have 
occurred when submitting a recommendation for major discipline, to 
include a summary of the Captain's Board input. 
(e) The Division Commander will submit a written recommendation to the 
Sheriff, detailing the violation, and the discipline being sought. Prior to 
submittal, the Division Commander will meet with the member and 
inform the member of the recommendation. 
(f) The Division Commander or designee will serve the Sheriffs notice of 
intent to discipline and the Sheriffs final notice of discipline to the 
member. 
(3) Supervisors 
(a) Supervisors have the authority to issue verbal and written warnings . 
Written warnings must be reviewed and approved by Division 
Commanders, through the chain of command, prior to issuance. 
(b) Supervisors may also recommend other disciplinary action by 
submitting written reports of misconduct to their Division Commander 
through the chain of command. 
(4) Publicity of Charges (Sworn) 
In the absence of an appeal to the Merit Commission, copies of such charges 
shall not be made public without the consent of a charged sworn employee. 
(17-30-19, UCA) 
Revised 11-1-98 
